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SPECIAL REPORT

International Law and The United States
Action in Grenada: A Report
COMMITTEE ON GRENADAEDWARD GORDON,* Chairman
RICHARD B. BILDERt
ARTHUR W. ROVINEtt
t
DON WALLACE, JR.tt

Editor's Note:
This is a special report submitted to the Council of the ABA Section of
InternationalLaw and Practiceby the Section's Committee on Grenada. It
was accepted by the Council as a report of the Committee on February 10,
1984. The reportdoes not necessarily representthe position of the Councilor
members of the ABA Section of International Law and Practice.
The LegalAdviser of the UnitedStates Departmentof State respondedto an
earlierdraftof the report,which was substantivelysimilarto the one published
here. His comments arepublished, with his permission, following the report.
Introduction
At its meeting in Washington on December 3, 1983, the Council of the
Section of International Law and Practice authorized the creation of an Ad
Hoc Committee on Grenada and directed it to prepare a report on legal
aspects of the intervention' in Grenada on October 25, 1983 by United

*Professor of Law, Albany Law School.
'Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School.
"tMr. Rovine practices law in New York City, and is Vice-Chairman of the General Division
of the ABA Section of International Law and Practice.
... Director, International Law Institute and Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law
Center.
1
The word "intervention" is used here and elsewhere in this Introduction to describe the
military action taken by the combined United States-Caribbean force, not as a legal conclusion
denoting unlawful interference in Grenada's internal affairs. See H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 64 (1952); H. WALDOCK, BRIERLY's THE LAW OF NATIONS 402 (6th ed.
1963); H. LAUTERPACHT, I OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 305 (7th ed. 1955); and Irizarry,
The Doctrine of Recognition and Intervention in Latin America, 28 TUL. L. REV. 313, 326
(1954).
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States military units aided by security forces from certain eastern Caribbean
states. This is the Committee's report.
Given time constraints, the Committee has chosen to limit the focus of
this report to international law aspects of the initial military intervention
itself. We have not considered the very significant international law implications of the military buildup and political repression on Grenada prior to the
intervention or of the conduct of United States military and civilian authorities on the island subsequently. Nor have we considered constitutional and
statutory law as they pertain to the action taken by the United States.
Although we do not take up these questions here, we in no sense minimize
their importance.
The Committee has been conscious of the difficulty of separating the
purely legal dimensions of the intervention in Grenada from the policy
questions it raises. It has not been easy to maintain this distinction; law and
policy are not mutually exclusive. Perhaps just as important, the intervention is controversial, here and abroad. By all published accounts, most
Grenadians are grateful for its success, and so are most of their Caribbean
neighbors and the American public. On the other hand, any military intervention in this hemisphere by the United States raises fresh doubts in
Latin America and elsewhere about the sincerity of this country's commitment to international legal obligations governing the use of force. Evenperhaps especially-within the small circle of lawyers who are professionally
concerned with these international obligations, a controversy rages over
whether the action taken by the United States was lawful. The Committee
has sought to objectively analyze the legal questions involved, free of any
suggestion of political partisanship. However, we recognize that in view of
the controversial nature of these issues, our conclusions may not please
everyone.
It has not escaped the Committee's notice that in some influential circles
the international law aspects of the military intervention in Grenada are
viewed as inconsequential, irrelevant as a policy consideration, or worse.
The nation's largest circulation daily newspaper, the Wall Street Journal,
told its more than two million readers in an editorial that "the only way we
will be able to make sense of the Grenada invasion is if all the international
lawyers agree to shut up." That is what we should not and will not do. The
ability of the United States to exert its influence in world affairs in furtherance of the humane and democratic values we most deeply believe in will be
determined in the long run by the perceived legitimacy of our imposing
national power, as well as by that power itself. Whatever immediate gains
flow from its use-psychological, political, strategic, even humanitarianare apt to be Pyrrhic if they come at too high a cost in terms of a loss in
credibility or legitimacy, especially the credibility of our commitment to the
rule of law.
That the United States has the military and political power to circumvent
VOL. 18, NO. 2
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its international legal obligations without fear of international sanction is
somewhat beside the point. So is the fact that as lawyers, arguing after the
event, we might be able to construct a strained if marginally plausible case
for the legality of the action taken by the United States in intervening in
Grenada. If in order to do so it is necessary to so arrange the variables and so
exaggerate the letter and spirit of the applicable legal norms that even we are
uncomfortable with the resulting argument, it is unlikely to convince anyone
else. Moreover, where, as in this case, the question presented is not only
whether the United States has complied with generally applicable rules of
law but also whether it has fulfilled important treaty commitments, a report
that treats these rules and commitments as infinitely manipulable would
serve no useful purpose.
Issues like the ones here presented, even when addressed in legal terms,
are ultimately decided by a global audience comprised of lawyers and
nonlawyers alike. Many in this audience are skeptical about the reality of
law as a constraint upon the use of force in international relations. International law in this context represents merely one among a number of competing ways of looking at international relations, each with its own set of
perspectives and standards for appraising the compatibility of national
behavior with the expectations of the informed, responsible members of the
world community. Among other things, it tends to emphasize long-term
interests more than some other perspectives and standards do. Undoubtedly, this contributes to its overall authority. But from time to time it means
that an international lawyer's view of eventsresists popular opinion. When
it does, and this may be one such instance, it is tempting to temper one's
legal opinion with one's policy preferences. If we were to do this, though, we
would be neglecting our responsibilities as members of the Section to work
towards enhancing the capacity of law to communicate a compelling authority in world affairs. And we would be ignoring the Council's directions in
establishing the Committee.
Some international lawyers in this country and elsewhere have publicly
denounced the United States action in Grenada as an unqualified violation
of the United Nations Charter, the Rio Treaty, the Charter of the Organization of American States and other relevant legal norms or sources of norms.
The United Nations Security Council, by a vote of 11 to 1, with only the
United States voting against (and three countries, including Great Britain,
abstaining), voted for a resolution condemning the military action in Grenada as "a flagrant violation of international law and of the independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity" of Grenada. The discussion of the
intervention in the OAS produced a number of similar expressions from
representatives of Latin American countries. Our own analysis suggests a
more restrained conclusion, but not a wholly different one.
What is clear is that there has been a steady erosion of the legal norms
governing the use of force in international relations that did not begin with
Spring 1984
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the United States intervention in Grenada, and that this erosion has left
national leaders feeling less constrained by these norms than they once
were. This, we think, is a dangerous trend. History has shown that the
successful use of the military instrument has a tendency to become habitforming, with the right to use armed force inferred by the victor from the fact
of the victory.
In some measure, existing legal norms governing the use of armed force
reflect past needs and experiences more than current ones. To the extent,
for example, that reasonable efforts to counter insidious forms of aggression, protect human rights, restore civil order or achieve other legitimate
ends do not square with the law or our present treaty commitments, perhaps
the law needs amendment and our treaty commitments need updating.
I. Developments Preceding the October 25th Action2
On October 25, 1983, United States military forces, accompanied by
security units from six Caribbean countries (the Caribbean Peace-Keeping
Force), landed on the island of Grenada, located about a hundred miles
north of the coast of Venezuela. Altogether, some 8,000 United States
troops were deployed in the operation, along with 300 members of the
Caribbean Peace-Keeping Force. By October 28th, the major military
objectives of the operation had been achieved.
Casualties to the United States armed forces are said to have totalled 18
killed and 116 wounded. At least 45 Grenadians were killed, among them 21
civilians killed in the accidental bombing of a mental hospital; 358 were
wounded. Of the roughly 800 Cuban personnel on the island, at least 34 died
and 59 were wounded in fighting with the American forces. Nearly 600 of the
approximately 1,000 American civilians on Grenada at the time of the
invasion were safely evacuated. By December 15th, all United States combat troops had been withdrawn from Grenada, leaving several hundred
American support personnel and security units, and 300 members of the
Caribbean Peace-Keeping Force, on the island.
The joint United States-Caribbean action followed a request to the
United States by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)
and-although the precise facts and legal weight of the matter remain
controversial-the Governor-General of Grenada for assistance in ending
the political turmoil triggered by the assassination of Grenadian Prime
Minister Maurice Bishop on October 19th. The roots of the Grenadian
upheaval, however, extend back at least to 1973, to the formation of the
New Jewel Movement (NJM) through the merger of two Grenadian political organizations: the Movement for Assemblies of the People, founded
2
See generally GRENADA: A PRELIMINARY REPORT, issued by the Departments of State and
Defense, Dec. 16, 1983; Massing, GrenadaBefore andAfter, THE ATLANTIC, Feb. 1984, at 76ff.
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by Maurice Bishop, and the Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education and
Liberation (whose acronym is "JEWEL").
After Grenada achieved independence from Great Britain on February 7,
1974, the NJM became the principal political opposition to the corrupt and
brutal regime of Sir Eric Gairy. In the 1976 elections, the NJM, in coalition
with other opposition parties, received 48 percent of the vote and became
the official parliamentary opposition to Mr. Gairy's administration. On
March 13, 1979, while Mr. Gairy was out of the country, the NJM mounted a
successful and generally popular coup d'etat. Mr. Bishop replaced Mr.
Gairy as Prime Minister of what then became known as the new People's
Revolutionary Government. He soon suspended the 1973 Grenadian Constitution and began to promulgate a series of "People's Laws."
Before the coup, Mr. Bishop and the New Jewel Movement had espoused
a blend of Marxist philosophy and West Indian nationalism, for instance
supporting decentralized village government and grass-roots agricultural
development while condemning the cultural impact of tourism. Upon coming to power, Mr. Bishop and the NJM adopted more clearly pronounced
Marxist-Leninist policies and organizational techniques. The United States
government was deeply suspicious of Mr. Bishop and the NJM from the
outset. Perhaps partly in consequence of what it viewed as United States
hostility, but in any event by design, Bishop and the NJM began to
strengthen Grenada's ties with the Soviet Union and other eastern bloc
nations, especially Cuba. The one-kilowatt station Radio Grenada was
rebuilt with Soviet and Cuban assistance into a 75-kilowatt station capable
of broadcasting throughout the Caribbean. Renamed Radio Free Grenada,
the NJM-controlled station replaced the British Broadcasting Corporation
as the island's news source, with items prepared by the Soviet TASS and
Cuban Prensa Latina news services. The new station reflected Soviet policy
on international issues and the NJM blocked the dissemination of competing
views by closing down all independent news media.
Pursuant to a 1979 treaty with Grenada, the Cuban government contributed between $40 and $60 million worth of work and material for the
construction of a new airport at Port Salines, on the southern tip of Grenada. Construction of the airport's 9,000 foot runway received some western financial and technical support, but the project was financially and
physically dominated by the Cuban government and Cuban personnel. At
the time of the United States-Caribbean military action, over 600 Cubans
were at work on the final stages of the runway's construction, which was
scheduled for completion in March 1984.
During Prime Minister Bishop's four and one-half years in office, Grenada moved successively closer to the Soviet-bloc nations, entering into a
variety of economic, diplomatic, and military assistance agreements with
these countries, particularly Cuba, the Soviet Union and East Germany.
During this time, Grenada built up its military power to a level disproporSpring 1984
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tionate to that of its Caribbean neighbors, most of whom had no permanent
armed forces. By the fall of 1983, the New Jewel Movement had built a
regular army of almost 600 men, supplemented by a militia estimated by
various sources at between 1,000 and 3,000 men. Military agreements with
the Soviet Union, Cuba and North Korea formed the basis of plans,
apparently obtained in the course of the United States-Caribbean intervention, that are said to have envisioned a Grenadian army of between 7,000
and 10,000 men. Cuba had furnished Grenada with some military equipment after the NJM came to power in 1979. The Soviet Union subsequently
provided sophisticated arms as well as military and intelligence training to
the Grenadian People's Revolutionary Army (PRA). Large caches of
weapons were discovered by the invasion forces.
It is not clear at what point dissension surfaced within the leadership of the
New Jewel Movement, although it appears to have at least coincided with a
meeting Prime Minister Bishop had with William Clark, National Security
Adviser to President Reagan, and Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary of
State, in Washington in June 1983. Minutes of the First Plenary Session of
the New Jewel Movement Central Committee from July 13-19, uncovered
by the invasion forces, indicate growing concern over a split within the
party. During the Central Committee meeting of August 29th, Prime Minister Bishop was denounced for straying from the Marxist-Leninist line and
contributing to rebellion within the party. Criticism of Mr. Bishop increased
during the meeting of September 14-16, at which time a proposal that he
share power with Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard was approved. The
decision was reportedly ratified by the membership of the NJM Central
Committee on September 25th.
From September 27th to October 8th, Bishop traveled to the Soviet
Union, Cuba and other Soviet-bloc nations. Upon his return to Grenada on
October 8th, he apparently attempted, but failed, to regain his authority
within the New Jewel Movement. At the October 12th meeting of the NJM
Central Committee, he was again denounced by the Coard faction and at
some time within the next 48 hours he was placed under house arrest by
PRA commander General Hudson Austin, a member of the NJM Central
Committee and Minister of Communications, Works and Labor.3
The status of government authority on Grenada at this point becomes
unclear. Several Central Committee members stated that Mr. Coard4 was in
3

In an address before the Associated Press Managing Editors' Conference in Louisville,
Kentucky, November 4, 1983 [hereinafter "AP Louisville speech"], Deputy Secretary Dam
said that Mr. Bishop had been put under house arrest the night of October 14th. 83 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 80 (1983). Other reports indicate that Mr. Bishop was arrested the night of the 12th or
13th.
4
Bernard Coard, who also served as Minister of Finance, Trade, Industry and Planning in the
Bishop administration, is said to have controlled a powerful, semi-secret group within the NJM
known as the Organization for Educational Advancement and Research. Regarded as a more
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control of the Party. He was also reported to be under the protection of
General Austin's People's Revolutionary Army, however, and was not seen
in Grenada until he was captured by American troops. Meanwhile, Central
Committee members loyal to Mr. Bishop sought but failed to secure Mr.
Bishop's release.'
On Monday, October 17th, news of Mr. Bishop's arrest was made public
by General Austin. The next day, five government ministers loyal to Mr.
Bishop resigned their posts, and then on Wednesday the 19th led several
thousand people in freeing Mr. Bishop from house arrest. The crowd
continued to the PRA garrison at Fort Rupert where Mr. Bishop apparently
took temporary control. PRA troops then attacked the garrison and fired
into the crowd, dispersing the Bishop loyalists. Mr. Bishop, several loyal
ex-cabinet ministers and union leaders were captured and, apparently,
summarily executed. At least 18 confirmed deaths were attributed to the
violence and many more were reported.
After Mr. Bishop's execution, the PRA announced the dissolution of the
existing government and the formation of a 16-member Revolutionary
Military Council (RMC) headed by General Austin. A round-the-clock,
shoot-on-sight curfew was imposed and scheduled to remain in effect until
6:00 p.m. October 24th. The Pearls Airport was closed and all scheduled
flights were cancelled. In the process, two United States diplomats flying to
Grenada from Barbados were turned back.
On Thursday the 20th, President Reagan directed United States warships
and troops bound for Lebanon to head instead towards Grenada, in the
event United States nationals had to be evacuated. 6 Then on Friday the 21st,
representatives of the six island states with which Grenada has been associated since 1981 in the OECS7 met at Bridgetown, Barbados, adopted a plan
of action to restore order in Grenada, and invited the other Caribbean states
with which they are associated in the larger association known as the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) to join with them in carrying out the
hard-line Marxist than Mr. Bishop, Coard reportedly resigned as Deputy Prime Minister on
October 12, 1983, to quell rumors that he was plotting to assassinate Mr. Bishop and take
control of the NJM. See Faerron, Dramatis Personae and Chronology, 12 CARIBBEAN REV. 10,
12 (1983); Sanchez, What Was Uncovered in Grenada, 12 CARIBBEAN REV. 20, 21; and The
Situation in Grenada,Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 4 (1983) (remarks of Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam).
5
See Interviewing George Louison, 12 CARIBBEAN REV. 17 (1983),
6
News conference, Secretary of State George Shultz, Oct. 25, 1983, 83 DEP'T ST. BULL. 69
(1983) (hereinafter "Shultz October 25 news conference").
7
The OECS was established by treaty June 19, 1981. Text reprinted in 20 1. L. M. 1166 (1981).
In addition to Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
which participated in the military operation against Grenada, the members of the OECS are
Montserrat and St. Kitts-Nevis, which did not, as well as Grenada itself.
8
CARICOM was established by treaty July 4, 1973. Text at 121. L.M. 1033 (1973). In addition
to the seven OECS states, the members of CARICOM as of October 25, 1983 were Barbados,
Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. Belize, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago
did not participate in the military action taken on the 25th.
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plan. They also formally invited the United States; indeed, the plan was
contingent upon United States military assistance.
Barbados and Jamaica, whose prime ministers were in Barbados at the
time of the OECS meeting on Friday, agreed to participate in the operation
and joined in asking the United States to lend the assistance the OECS had
requested. The rest of the CARICOM states, whose representatives had
gone to Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, for a meeting on the Grenada situation (see
below), met on Saturday the 22nd in a meeting that lasted until the early
hours of Sunday morning and ended inconclusively. When the CARICOM
meeting resumed later Sunday, the subject of the proposed military intervention was not taken up; instead, the discussion turned to the imposition
of economic and political sanctions against Grenada. 9 Ultimately, the only
non-OECS CARICOM states that participated in the October 25th military
operation were Barbados and Jamaica.
On Saturday, President Reagan sent a personal emissary, Ambassador
Frank McNeil, to the Caribbean to determine first-hand the views of the
OECS states, Barbados and Jamaica. At about this time, the United States
proposed several alternative means for evacuating Americans who wished
to leave: e.g., by cruise ship, chartered aircraft, military aircraft. These
proposals were rejected by the RMC, which meanwhile announced that
Pearls Airport would be reopened to normal traffic by Monday the 24th.
At some point over the weekend the RMC became aware that the United
States and certain Caribbean states were preparing to launch a full-scale
military attack on Grenada. On Monday the 24th, the RMC sent a telex to
the United States embassy in Barbados urging the United States and its
Caribbean allies not to invade Grenada. The telex stated in pertinent part:
It is our information that at a meeting of some [Caribbean Community] governments in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, on Sunday 23rd October, 1983, some of the
participating governments decided on establishing a military force to invade
Grenada. In their decision they called for direct participation of extra-regional
forces in invading Grenada.
We are concerned because in many reports the name of the government of the
United States of America has been mentioned as participating in such a military
force to invade our country. We also have concrete information that for tht past 18
hours two warships have been patrolling between 12 and 15 kilometers off the
shores of Grenada, well within our territorial waters.

We should view any invasion of our country, whether based on the decision of
those [Caribbean Community] governments or by that of any other government,
as a rude violation of Grenada's sovereignty and of international law.
9
The CARICOM states voted 11 to I to impose economic sanctions against Grenada and to
refer an agreed proposal to restructure CARICOM to the regions' attorney-generals for advice
on how to effectuate it. The proposal was to include human rights and democratic government
qualifications and to remove the strict unanimity rule applicable to certain CARICOM decision-making. Guyana reportedly dissented from these actions and said it would not participate
in the restructured CARICOM.

VOL. 18, NO. 2

United States Action in Grenada
Furthermore, any such invasion can only lead to the loss of lives of thousands of
men, women and children, therefore we strongly condemn such a decision.
The present situation in Grenada (that is, as of October 24, 1983) is of an entirely
internal and domestic nature. And presently peace, calm and good order prevail in
our country. For these reasons, we do not understand the basis or the reasons for
the reported violent reaction of some Caribbean and other governments.
We view any threat or the use of force by any country or group of countries as a
gross and unwarranted interference in the domestic affairs of our sovereign and
independent country.
Grenada has not and is not threatening the use of force against any country, and
we do not have any such aspirations.... We are not seeking military confrontation
with any country or group of countries, but, on the contrary, we are prepared to
hold discussions with those countries in order to ensure good relations and mutual
understanding and with a view to maintaining and strengthening the historic ties
with all these countries.

The telex also provided assurances about the safety of foreign nationals on
Grenada:
We are also concerned about the reports that the government of the United States
of America is considering sending battleships to evacuate citizens of your country
presently residing peacefully in Grenada. We reiterate that the lives, well-being
and property of every American and other foreign citizen residing in Grenada are
fully protected and guaranteed by our government. However, any American or
foreign citizen in our country who desires to leave Grenada for whatever reason
can do so using the normal procedures through our airport or commercial aircrafts. As far as we are concerned, these aircrafts can be of regular flights or
chartered flights, and we will facilitate them in every way we can.'"

In fact, however, Pearls Airport was not officially reopened on October 24th
as promised, and no regular commercial flights were available, although it

was reported that four chartered flights, some carrying Americans, did leave
Grenada on October 24th."
As noted, the RMC telex contained assurances that "presently peace,
calm and good order prevail in our country." It also said that "the Revolu-

tionary Council of Grenada has no desire or aspiration to rule the country"

1The text of the telex was read to the Permanent Council of the OAS at its October 26th
meeting by Ian Jacobs, Grenada's representative. Transcript of Extraordinary Session of the
Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, Oct. 26, 1983. OEA/Ser. G, Doc.
CP/ACTA 543/83, 4-5 [hereinafter "OAS Transcript"].
"The Canadian government, with the permission of authorities on Grenada, had chartered a
Leeward Islands Air Transport (LIAT) plane to evacuate Canadian nationals from Grenada on
Monday, October 24th. At the last minute, LIAT abruptly cancelled the flight. LIAT is owned
by several Caribbean countries. The reason for its cancellation of the evacuation flight is not
known. There has been speculation in the press that the U.S. Government pressured LIAT to
cancel the flight in order to bolster the U.S. contention that the RMC was unreliable and that
U.S. nationals on Grenada were in danger of being held hostage. See, e.g., Barrow, The Danger
of Rescue Operations, 12 CARIBBEAN REV. 3, 4 (1983). The incident and the charges that the
U.S. caused it received wide publicity in Canada.
Spring 1984
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but rather is "beginning the process of establishing a fully constituted
civilian government within 10 to 14 days." 12
Despite this plea for nonintervention13 and a communique sent by the
government of Cuba to the State Department on October 22nd requesting
negotiations with a view to avoiding a resort to force, United States military
forces, followed by the Carribean Peace-Keeping Force, launched the invasion of Grenada the following morning, Tuesday the 25th. American forces
met stiff resistance from armed Cuban personnel stationed on Grenada,
especially the airport construction workers around Port Salines, and from
elements of the Grenadian army and militia. Within a few days, however,
most resistance had been overcome and virtually all opposition to the
intervention had subsided.
II. The Action Taken by the Caribbean
States and the United States
A.

THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE
BARBADOS AND JAMAICA

OECS,

Following the invasion on the 25th, the OECS Secretariat issued a statement explaining the circumstances that caused the OECS states to act and
identifying the provisions of the OECS'constituent treaty under which their
action was taken. The statement cited the deterioration of conditions on
Grenada following the murder of Mr. Bishop and his fellow-ministers; the
imposition of the shoot-on-sight curfew; and the indications that, unlike Mr.
Bishop, the RMC was unpopular with the Grenadian people. It also mentioned the extensive military build-up in Grenada in the past few years,
12Inthis respect, the telex said:

We further take this opportunity to inform your government that the Revolutionary Military
Council of Grenada has no desire or aspiration to rule the country. We are presently
beginning the process of establishing a fully constituted civilian government within 10 to 14
days. Such a government would be broad-based expressing the interests of all social classes
and strata in our country. We have already held discussions with our local chamber of
commerce and industry, commercial bank managers and hoteliers, as part of the process of
constituting such a government. Our civilian government would pursue a policy of mixed
economy with state, cooperative, and private sectors and would encourage foreign and local
investments within the framework of the national interest of our country ...
These assurances were later cited by U.S. government officials as evidence of a vacuum of
authority in Grenada. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 27th, Deputy Secretary Dam said:
[I]t was never clear that [General] Austin or any other coherent group was in fact in charge.
The RMC members indicated only that a new government would be announced in 10 days or
2 weeks.
The Situation in Grenada, supra note 4, at 4, and again at 6, 17, 28, 30 and 34-35.
3
The State Department has given us to understand that it regarded the assurances contained
in the RMC telex as unreliable in light of the fact that the individual who sent it, Major Leon
Cornwall, was the one who had already rejected the proposals put forward by the U.S. for
peaceful evacuation of U.S. nationals. Major Cornwall was Grenada's ambassador to Cuba and
a close political ally of Mr. Coard.
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which it said had created a disproportionality between Grenada's military

strength and that of the rest of the OECS states. "The military might in the
hands of the present group [i.e., the RMC]," the statement said, "has posed
a serious threat to the security of the OECS countries and other neighboring
states." 4
The OECS countries were also concerned about possible military uses of
the 9,000 foot runway at the Port Salines Airport and by the presence of so
4

The complete text of the OECS statement reads as follows:
The member governments of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States ... met at
Bridgetown, Barbados, on Friday 21st October 1983 to consider and evaluate the situation in
Grenada arising out of the overthrow of the Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and the
subsequent killing of the Prime Minister together with some of his Cabinet colleagues and a
number of other citizens.
The member states were deeply concerned that this situation would continue to worsen,
that there would be further loss of life, personal injury and a general deterioration of public
order as the military group in control attempted to secure its position.
Member governments considered that the subsequent imposition of a draconian 96 hour
curfew by the military group in control was intended to allow them to further suppress the
population of Grenada which had shown by numerous demonstrations their hostility to this
group.
Member governments have also been greatly concerned that the extensive military buildup in Grenada over the last few years had created a situation of disproportionate military
strength between Grenada and other OECS countries. This military might in the hands of the
present group has posed a serious threat to the security of the OECS countries and other
neighboring states.
Member governments considered it of the utmost urgency that immediate steps should be
taken to remove this threat.
Under the provisions of Article 8 of the Treaty establishing the OECS concerning defence
and security in the sub-region, member governments of the Organization decided to take
appropriate action.
Bearing in mind the relative lack of military resources in the possession of the other OECS
countries, the member governments have sought assistance for this purpose from friendly
countries within the region and subsequently from outside.
Three governments have responded to the OECS member governments' requests to form
a pre-emptive defensive strike in order to remove this dangerous threat to peace and security
to their sub-region and to establish a situation of normalcy in Grenada. These governments
are Barbados, Jamaica and the United States of America. Barbados and Jamaica are
members of CARICOM and Barbados is linked to some of the OECS member governments
in a sub-regional security agreement.
It is the intention of the member governments of the OECS that once the threat has been
removed, they will invite the Governor-General of Grenada to assume executive authority of
the country under the provisions of the Grenada Constitution of 1973 and to appoint a
broad-based interim government to administer the country pending the holding of general
elections.
It has been agreed that while these arrangements are being put in place, the presence of
former Prime Minister Eric Gairy and other undesirable political elements would complicate
the situation and that they would therefore not be welcome in Grenada.
It is further intended that arrangements should be made to establish effective police and
peace keeping forces in order to restore and maintain law and order in the country.
After normalcy has been restored, non-Caribbean forces will be invited to withdraw from
Grenada.
Member governments of the OECS wish to solicit the diplomatic support of all friendly
countries for this initiative.
83 DEP'T ST. BULL. 67, 68 (1983).
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many Cuban personnel on Grenada. At the time of the invasion, nearly 800
Cubans were on the island, including 53 military and security advisers and
over six hundred armed, combat-trained construction workers at Port
Salines. Premier Fidel Castro of Cuba has maintained that concern over the
Cubans was groundless, claiming that over half of the construction workers
were over the age of 40, that they were engaged in strictly civilian activity,
and that their weapons had been provided by the Bishop regime for selfdefense in the event of foreign invasion. Be that as it may, armed, combattrained construction workers are an ominous innovation in the Eastern
Caribbean.
The OECS perspective was summarized by St. Lucia's representative at
the meeting of the OAS Permanent Council on October 26th:
[11n the past four years Grenada had built up her armed forces, with the
assistance of both regional and nonregional totalitarian states, to a level unmatched by any other country in the Eastern Caribbean. History has shown, and
our own intelligence reports have confirmed, that the microcosmic territory of
Grenada was rapidly becoming too small to contain both its revolutionary zeal and
the mounting tons of military hardware."
The precise sequence of events which led to the OECS action is still not
entirely clear. The fullest explanation offered so far is that which was
provided by Prime Minister Tom Adams of Barbados in a radio address to
his countrymen on Wednesday, October 26th, the day after the invasion.
Mr. Adams reported that as early as Saturday, October 15th, while Mr.
Bishop was still being held in custody by the RMC, "an American official"
approached an official of the Barbados Ministry of Defense about the
prospect of rescuing Mr. Bishop. The American indicated that the United
States government was prepared to supply transport for such a mission.6
Talks concerning the rescue plan continued for several days, according to
Mr. Adams, involved several Caribbean and non-Caribbean countries, and
culminated in a decision by the Barbados cabinet on Wednesday the 19th to
proceed, in collaboration with eastern Caribbean states and "larger nonCaribbean countries with the resources necessary to carry out such an
5
OAS
6

Transcript, supra note 10, at 22.
Of this offer Mr. Adams said:
This raised a number of questions: Would the regime perhaps allow Bishop to leave and go
into exile? If not, would Bishop wish to be rescued? There were many other political
prisoners in Grenada, put there by Bishop's government. It would clearly not have been right
to attempt to save Bishop but ignore the detainees, some of whom had spent more than four
years behind bars. This was a point put especially strongly by Prime Minister Cato of St.
Vincent and the Grenadines when I approached him about the matter as one of the heads of
government of the member countries of our regional security pact. I spoke also to other pact
members and to officials of two friendly non-Caribbean countries, and took the advice of
Colonel, now Brigadier Lewis, the regional security coordinator. Talks about a possible
rescue were commenced and continued.
Transcript, address by Prime Minister Adams, Oct. 26, 1983. A copy of this transcript has been
made available to the Committee by the State Department.
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intricate operation." The Barbados cabinet was still in session, discussing
the plan, when Mr. Bishop was rescued by Grenadians loyal to him, a rescue
which, as already noted, led to his death.
Mr. Adams said that the next day, Thursday the 20th, he received a
telephone call from Prime Minister John Compton of St. Lucia in which Mr.
Compton proposed a Caribbean initiative on a multinational basis to restore
law and order on Grenada and to lead it to early elections. Mr. Adams said
that he, and later in the day his cabinet, agreed to support the proposal on
the condition that Caribbean leaders were given an opportunity to discuss
the situation and to act jointly. Mr. Compton thereupon called Prime
Minister George Chambers of Trinidad and Tobago, the then current chairman of the heads of government of CARICOM, requesting a meeting of
CARICOM states in Barbados. Mr. Chambers apparently did call such a
meeting, scheduling it for the next day, the 21st; but he named Port-ofSpain, Trinidad, as its venue rather than Bridgetown.
Whatever was going on, the heads of government of Barbados, Jamaica
and the six OECS states (i.e., other than Grenada) were in Bridgetown,
while the other CARICOM representatives proceeded to Port-of-Spain. As
it turned out-and as previously noted-the CARICOM states did not
meet, as such, until Saturday the 22nd, that is, until the day after the OECS,
joined by Barbados and Jamaica, had decided formally to restore order on
Grenada and to ask the United States to provide the military forces needed
to secure control on the island.
It is useful at this point to mention the controversy that later surrounded
the OECS action. It was caused, at least in part, by the reference in the
OECS Secretariat's post-invasion statement to Article 8 of the OECS
treaty. Article 8 establishes a Defence and Security Committee, comprised
of the ministers of defense of the member states (or other ministers or
plenipotentiaries designated by the respective heads of government). The
Defence and Security Committee's authority is circumscribed, being limited
by Article 8 to responses to "external aggression." This suggested to some
observers that the OECS had acted ultra vires its constitutent treaty, since
the aspects of the Grenada situation that the OECS statement cited as giving
rise to its concern seemed to be entirely internal to Grenada.
Moreover, Article 8 requires unanimity. Grenada itself did not participate in the October 21st meeting; and press accounts indicated that, while
there had been unanimity among the other six OECS states on the need to
take some joint action, only four of the six had voted for the plan actually
carried out on the 25th. The others were said to have abstained.' 7
It is possible that the press accounts misinterpreted Montserrat's and St.
Kitts-Nevis' nonparticipation in the multinational force as lack of support
"TSee, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, at A19.
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for it, whereas the explanation may lie merely in their lack of security forces
sufficient to make personnel available. Prime Minister Adams stated in his
radio address on the 26th that the OECS had acted unanimously. So did
American officials, although their formal statements in this regard were
somewhat ambiguous. 8 We have been advised by the State Department,
without reservation, that the OECS states acted unanimously.
In the first days following the October 25th operation, OECS and United
States officials repeatedly cited Article 8, and only this provision, as legal

justification for the OECS action under its treaty.'9 Later, American officials, at least, retreated from Article 8, citing provisions of the OECS
treaty that bestow plenary power upon the heads of government, acting in
the capacity of "the Authority," i.e., acting under Article 6 of the treaty
which creates this body and describes it as "the supreme policy-making
institution" of the organization. 2' Together with related provisions, it
accords greater discretion than does Article 8 standing alone.
How much more is open to question. It is still not obvious that the OECS
treaty contemplates the use of armed force against a member state, especially an invasion having the objective of resolving an internal struggle for
control of its authority structure. Nor is it obvious that the treaty contemplates an invitation to a militarily dominant non-OECS power to lead such

an invasion.
It is clear that, at least ordinarily, the individuals who act as the Defence
and Security Committee under Article 8 are not those who act as the
Authority under Article 6. Prime Minister Adams reported that there had
actually been two meetings of the OECS Friday night, the 21st. The first
meeting, early in the evening, had been attended by the ministers of de18
In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 27th, Deputy
Secretary Dam said that President Reagan's emissary, Ambassador McNeil, had met in
Bridgetown with OECS and regional leaders, and that Ambassador McNeil had found them
"unanimous in their conviction that the deteriorating conditions on Grenada were a threat to
the entire region that required immediate and forceful action. They strongly reiterated their
appeal for U.S. assistance." THE SITUATION IN GRENADA, supranote 4, at 5. This is not quite the
same as saying that he found them unanimously agreed to the specific plan of military action
that had been taken up at the October 21st meeting(s) of the OECS. The same ambiguity
appears in President Reagan's own statement, on October 25th, that the OECS states, Barbados and Jamaica "joined unanimously in asking the U.S. to participate." 83 DEP'T ST. BULL. 67
(1983). Similarly, in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on November 2nd,
Deputy Secretary Dam said that Ambassador McNeil had met with the prime ministers of
Barbados, Jamaica and Dominica and found them to be unanimous. The prime minister of
Dominica, Eugenia Charles, was chairing the OECS Authority at the time, but it is not clear
from Secretary Dam's remarks to the House Committee whether her support for the plan of
military action was given in behalf of her own country or for all the OECS states.
"9See OAS Transcript, supra note 10, at 23 (representative of St. Lucia), 25 (Dominica), 29
(U.S.), and 48 (St. Vincent and the Grenadines). See also Shultz October 25 news conference,
supra note 6, at 69; and THE SITUATION iN GRENADA, supra note 4, at 5, 29-31, and 34-35.
"See Dam, AP Louisville speech, supra note 3.
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fense, acting as the Defence and Security Committee; the second, later that
evening, had been attended by the heads of government-and, by invitation, Mr. Adams himself-acting as the Authority.
Either way, Grenada itself was not represented. But while this might be
deemed a critical absence for the purposes of Article 8 and the work of the
Defence and Security Committee, for which absolute unanimity is required,
it is less so under the voting provisions applicable to action taken by the
Authority. These provisions require only the affirmative vote of member
states present and voting, provided that nonpresent, nonvoting states later
ratify the action taken."
In any event, Mr. Adams revealed-and subsequent announcements
from all relevant parties later stressed-that the OECS states had acted in
response to a confidential request for assistance from Grenada's GovernorGeneral, Sir Paul Scoon. The fact of Mr. Scoon's invitation was delayed
until his safety had been assured by United States forces shortly after the
invasion began.22 Even without the initial silence, but more so because of it,
news of the invitation from Mr. Scoon was greeted with skepticism.23 Critics doubted-many still do-whether Mr. Scoon had acted voluntarily;

21
Deputy Secretary Dam offered two explanations for the view that the unanimity required by
Article 8 was present even though Grenada was not represented at the OECS meeting(s). One
is that Grenada implicitly participated, since the OECS was acting in response to a confidential
appeal from Grenada's Governor General, Sir Paul Scoon. The other is that the OECS
agreement should not be construed in a way which would force the remaining OECS governments to remain inactive in the event a vacuum of authority occurs in one of them. In cases of
doubt, he said, the parties to a treaty are the best judges of the meaning of its terms. THE
SIUATION IN GRENADA, supra note 4, at 30-31.
2
See Dam, AP Louisville speech, supra note 3. In the course of the United Nations Security
Council debate on the intervention in Grenada, the Permanent Representative of St. Lucia,
one of the OECS members whose security forces participated in the intervention, said: "It was
the Governor-General who made a formal request to the Organization of Eastern Caribbean
States ... for assistance to remove what he saw as a threat to his people and what at that stage
had also become a threat to our subregion."
United Nations Doc. S/P.V. 2491, at 16, as quoted by John Carey, formerly a member of the
U.S.
delegation to the U.N., in a letter to the New York Times published Nov. 23, 1983, at A22.
23
Perhaps typical is the following comment of Errol Barrow, an attorney who was prime
minister of Barbados from 1966 to 1976 and is now leader of the opposition there:
Even if one is tempted to believe the belated excuse that Sir Paul Scoon invited the
intervention-a story that not even the most uncritical follower of the events is tempted to
entertain-it must not be forgotten that Sir Paul, like the famous Vicar of Bray, had been
appointed by dictator Sir Eric Gairy and maintained his office under an alleged left-wing
Marxist regime which seized power only five days after his accession to the largely ceremonial
post. He remained in residence, although not in power, for more than four years unheralded,
unsung and unknown to the world. It should not have been difficult for Sir Paul to adjust
himself to a third authoritarian regime which had not, up to that stage, either declared nor
displayed any intention to remove or replace him.
Barrow, The Danger of Rescue Operations, 12 CARIBBEAN REV. 3, 4, (1983). Governor General
Scoon was appointed by the Queen, upon the recommendation, presumably, of the then prime
minister of Grenada, Mr. Gairy.
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whether he extended his invitation before or after the OECS acted, indeed,
after the invasion had begun and he had been rescued; and whether the plan
to invade Grenada was really contingent upon Mr. Scoon's invitation or was
designed to go forward, invitation or not.24
Mr. Adams revealed in his radio address that "well before the military
operations commenced" Mr. Scoon's views were sought "on the issuing of
an invitation to friendly countries to enter Grenada and restore order." Mr.
Adams did not say precisely when, how or through whom the suggestion
that Mr. Scoon issue an invitation was conveyed, referring only to "the kind
offices of a friendly, albeit nonparticipating government (not the USA)."
Mr. Scoon has been equally circumspect, alluding to "a lot of diplomatic
movement between my house and several other people," without indicating
when or through whom the suggestion was made, who these "other people"
were or what, if any, pressure was brought to bear to encourage him to issue
his invitation. His public statements on these points have been ambiguous.
In at least two interviews, he has said that he asked for outside help on
Sunday night, the 23rd-i.e., two nights after the OECS decision, several
hours after President Reagan decided, provisionally, to proceed with the
military assistance requested by the OECS (see below), but before the
actual invasion. The relevant part of the transcript of the first of these
interviews, with the BBC-TV program "Panorama" on October 31st, reads
as follows:
Q: What was the moment you decided that an invasion was necessary?
A: I think I decided so on Sunday the 23rd, late Sunday evening.
Q: But the British say that on that day you told them you still didn't want one, that
was early in the day wasn't it?
A: I did see somebody earlier in the day and during that time I did see somebody
and they said you know invasion was the last thing they wanted and I said it in
my speech. But if it came to that I would give every support, and later on, as
things deteriorated, I thought, because people were scared you know. I had
several calls from responsible people in Grenada that something should be
done. Mr. Governor-General we are depending on you (that) something be
done: People in Grenada cannot do it, you must get help from outside. What I
did ask for was not an invasion but help from outside. 5
24

See generally GRENADA WAR

POWERS: FULL COMPLIANCE REPORTING AND IMPLEMENTATION,

Markup before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); and THE
SITUATION IN GRENADA, supra note 4. The United States Ambassador to France, Evan G.
Galbraith, was reported to have told a French television audience that preparations for the
October 25th operation had begun two weeks earlier. If so, that would place the planning in
advance of Mr. Bishop's murder. Asked about Ambassador Galbraith's statement, Deputy
Secretary Dam told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Mr. Galbraith was "dead
wrong." Id., at 11, 45. See also F. Castro, speech in Havana November 14, 1983, as translated
and published in Gramma (the English language organ of the Cuban Communist Party), on
Nov. 20, 1983, p. 3.
25
Hereinafter, "Panorama interview." The transcript of this interview has been made available to the Committee by the State Department.
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Another interview, which appeared in a Caribbean newspaper on December 4th, confirms this account. In relevant part it reads as follows:
Q: Sir Paul, at what point did you form the view that you would have to seek
assistance from outside?
A: On Sunday 23rd in the evening.
Q: What led you to decide that?
A: Because of the deteriorating situation . . . what I thought to be (the) de-

teriorating situation of the Military Council.
Q: Up to that point what had been your relationship with the Military Council?
A: My relationship was always very good. They came to me soon after they
assumed power and told me what their plans were. They kept me in the picture
as to what they were doing. As to whether or not I approved of the things they
wanted to do is a different matter. I do not wish to comment on that.
Q: So that it was after the Prime Minister was killed that you then took this
position?
A: Oh, from the time that the Prime Minister was killed people were ringing me,
writing me, and sending messages saying, Mr. Governor-General, you have to
do something. We are depending on you. You are the only man left now. What
are you doing about it? People were so shocked and people obviously did not
relish the thought of having military people in control and from that time they
were saying to me, 'please do something about it.' So the period between the
19th and the intervention by the Caribbean and U.S. forces was a difficult
period for me. Very, very difficult period for me.
Q: Whom did you contact to seek the assistance?
A: There was a lot of diplomatic movement between my house and several other
people. That I do not wish to comment on but eventually we had to make a
formal request to the OECS.
Q: Were you aware at the time you contacted the OECS that this would probably
mean that they would invite the Americans in?
A: Oh yes. I was aware of that.
Q: And you had no reservation about this?
A: No. Not really. I felt all along the OECS forces or even the whole Caribbean
area, with all the forces put together, couldn't quell any sort of rebellion here
because I knew, although I didn't know the exact amount, and was horrified
that we had so much arms and ammunition in this country. I knew that we were
well stocked with arms and ammunition....

26

Mr. Scoon's interviews do not fully resolve doubts about how voluntary
his invitation was or whether, in fact, he asked for a full-scale invasion or

merely security forces to assure the performance of civil administration and
police functions. Moreover, the interviews do not settle the legal question of
whether he had authority under Grenadian law to invite foreign troops to
invade his country.
Commentators critical of the ensuing invasion have argued that the authority of the Governor General of Grenada is essentially ceremonial,
2Mr. Scoon's interview appeared in The Sunday Gleaner (Kingston, Jamaica), Dec. 4, 1983,
under the caption, Sir Paul Scoon, Governor-Generalof Grenada, in an interview with the
Sunday Express of Trinidad and Tobago.
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similar in this respect to that of Governor-Generals in other Commonwealth
countries. This subject had attracted attention in the legal community
several years earlier in connection with a widely publicized constitutional
debate in Australia, another Commonwealth country, after Australia's
Governor-General had called new elections in circumstances in which his
authority to do so was less than certain. As it turns out, however, the legal
position of Governor-Generals varies among Commonwealth countries.
Under Article 57 of the 1973 Grenada Constitution, the executive authority
of Grenada is vested in the Queen of Grenada, Queen Elizabeth II, who
happens as well to be the Queen of England and of other Commonwealth
constitutional monarchies. It may be exercised in her behalf by the Governor-General, either directly or through an officer subordinate to him."
For whatever reason, when the regime of Maurice Bishop suspended-or
purported to suspend-the Grenadian Constitution in 1979, it left the
Governor-General's position more or less intact, with the exception that he
was to "perform such functions as the People's Revolutionary Government
may from time to time advise." 28
Given the deterioration of law and order in Grenada following Bishop's
assassination, the OECS, the United States, Barbados, Jamaica and later
even the United Nations accepted Mr. Scoon's authority to act in Grenada's
27

See The Situation in Grenada, Report of the United Nations Secretary-General, Nov. 6,
1983, U.N. Doc. A/38/568.
In his December 4th interview, supra note 26, Mr. Scoon was asked whether he saw any
problem in the fact that he did not contact "Her Majesty's Government" (i.e., in Great
Britain). "Being the Queen's representative in Grenada," the questioner said, "do you regard
your action in going to the OECS and the possibilities that arose from that to be in any way in
conflict with your appointment?" He replied:
They don't conflict at all. Her Majesty has many governments. You see, lots of people don't
understand the constitutional position of Grenada. The Queen is the head of Grenada and
the British Government can't dictate to the Government of Grenada what to do, nor can the
British Government give any orders to the Governor-General of Grenada. The Queen is the
Queen of Grenada, or Australia, as the case may be. I think people missed that point all the
time ...

28
Declaration of Grenada Revolution dated March 28, 1979, People's Law No. 3 ("The Head
of State shall remain her Majesty the Queen and her representative in this country shall
continue to be the Governor-General who shall perform such functions as the People's
Revolutionary Government may from time to time advise."). See also People's Laws Nos. 16
and 18, dated April 2, 1979.
Mr. Scoon was asked how he throught the interim government would perform in relation to
his own office. He replied:
They would act in the way that Ministers who have acted under the electoral system (have
acted). And they would advise me just as a Cabinet would advise. Except that perhaps during
the interim period I would be more involved. Under the electoral system the Government
advises the Governor-General and he virtually has to do what the Government says. But I
think in my case it will be necessary sometimes to do more things in my own deliberate
judgment ...I am very conscious of the fact that I am the Queen's representative and so my
job is more or less just a ceremonial one.
Id.
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behalf. To an extent, this represents political recognition of Mr. Scoon's
authority, at least by authorities outside Grenada and after his de facto

control of Grenada had been assured by the interposition of foreign military
force. The apparent popularity of Mr. Scoon's action among Grenadians
may be said to represent an informal confirmation of his authority by the
Grenadians themselves; it, too, reflects the control which the predominantly
American military force has been able to establish in Grenada in Mr.

Scoon's behalf.
There is reason to argue that under applicable rules of recognition,
General Austin's Revolutionary Military Council was entitled to recognition as the de facto, if not the de jure, government of Grenada. Those who
feel it should have been recognized point to the fact that the new RMC was
in sufficient control of the island to impose a 96-hour curfew over the
weekend preceding the invasion and that it was with members of this group
that the United States, Great Britain and Canada negotiated in an effort to
assure the safety of their nationals. Mr. Scoon may have inadvertently
added support to this view in his October 31st interview when he analogized
the RMC's position to that of the NJM, when it seized power in March 1979:
[W]hen the military took over they quickly came to me and acknowledged my
authority as representative of the Queen, in the same way as the People's Revolutionary Government did when they overthrew the elected government.29

Nevertheless, by Sunday night, the 23rd, Mr. Scoon had apparently
decided that the situation required the formation of a new government, but
that he was powerless to initiate or enforce this conclusion in the absence of
outside help."
29

Scoon, Panorama interview, supra note 25. Similarly, in his December 4th interview, supra
note 26, Mr. Scoon reported that the military leaders had come to him "soon after they assumed
power" and told him what their plans were. "They kept me in the picture as to what they were
doing," he said in the interview.
'In his Panorama interview, supra note 25, Mr. Scoon said that he first asked the OECS to
ask the United States whether it could help and that he then confirmed this in writing to
President Reagan. Deputy Secretary of State Dam said in his AP Louisville speech, supra note
3, that the United States was informed on Monday, October 24th, by Prime Minister Adams
that Mr. Scoon had used a confidential channel to transmit an appeal to the OECS and other
regional states. This appeal, too, was apparently in writing. Transcript of radio address by Mr.
Adams, supra note 16. British newspapers indicated that the invitation from Mr. Scoon had
been signed only after incoming troops had broken a cordon of armored cars outside Government House, in Grenada, and rescued Mr. Scoon, presumably some time Monday, October
25th. In its October 28th edition, The Guardian reported:
Commonwealth diplomatic sources last night indicated that this was only signed after the
incoming troops had broken the cordon of armoured cars outside Government House and
rescued Sir Paul Scoon. The Governor-General had reckoned that if he had signed it earlier,
with the intention of getting it smuggled out, and it had been intercepted, then he would have
signed his own death warrant ...
Official scources at Whitehall last night acknowledged that the deputy head of the British
High Commission in Barbados, Mr. David Montgomery, had seen Sir Paul on Sunday
morning October 23rd during a 36-hour visit to the island, but that he had not played the role
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The United States government has indicated that it regarded the situation
on the island as one of anarchy3" and that it concurred in Prime Minister
Adams' judgment that "the Governor-General of Grenada was the only
constitutional authority remaining in the country, and the only one who in
addition to any treaty rights which might and did exist could issue a formal

invitation to foreign countries to enter Grenada to restore order ....
"Accordingly," Mr. Adams said, "the participating countries have no...
difficulty in deciding that he should be invested with formal authority as
soon as his person should be secured-and this was made a number one
priority at operations level."
We are not in a position to judge whether Mr. Scoon acted in accordance

with his authority under Grenadian constitutional law; whether Grenada's
British style constitutional monarchy survived the NJM's 1979 coup d'etat;33

whether, if not, the post of Governor-General was even more ceremonial
under the People's Laws than it had been under the 1973 Constitution;
whether Mr. Scoon was entitled under the People's Laws to ignore the
counsel of the NJM or, if this be the case, its successor, the RMC; or any
other aspect of the question of the compatibility of Mr. Scoon's action with
internal Grenadian law. Moreover, we note that thus far the leaders of the

RMC have not been heard from. They have been in custody since they were
captured by American troops in the course of October's fighting. We presume that when they have an opportunity to explain their position, the
question of the lawfulness of Mr. Scoon's action under Grenadian law will
of messenger. However, two American diplomats traveled in the same plane with Mr.
Montgomery, and have since been uncommunicative about their movements except to say
that the joint mission was to determine that US and British nationals were not in danger.
Senator Charles Percy, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, indicated
during Mr. Dam's testimony on October 27th that Mr. Scoon had been flown out of Grenada
following
his rescue by United States troops. THE SITUATION IN GRENADA, supra note 4, at 3.
3
'At his news conference on October 25th, Secretary of State Shultz said:
For all intents and purposes, there is no semblance of a genuine government present. There is
a vacuum of governmental responsibility-the only genuine evidence of governmental
authority being a shoot-on-sight curfew. So in the light of that and in the light of the affinity
that the other states feel together, they felt they had to protect their peace and their security
by taking this action and that doing so would help reconstitute legitimate government in
Grenada.
And he added this:
As far 'as the establishment of authority on the island is concerned, we believe that the
Governor-General is the logical person, given the fact that there is a vacuum of government
there, and we expect that it will occur that way.
83 32DEP'T ST. BULL. 70, 71, (1983). See also note 12, supra.
Supra note 16. In its October 28th edition, The Guardian said that British ministers and
constitutional lawyers had concluded that the Governor-General has authority to act when law
and33 order is breaking down.
Mr. Bishop, as prime minister, regularly attended the meetings of Commonwealth heads of
state presided over by Queen Elizabeth II. Maingot, Optionsfor Grenada, 12 CARIBBEAN REV.
24, 28, (1983).
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be reexamined. For the moment, at least, we are inclined to leave this
question aside.
Whatever may be said of Mr. Scoon's authority to ask the OECS and
other states to restore order, and whether and when he did so, the OECS'
action is suspect by virtue of the reference in the OECS Secretariat's
statement to the organization's request to friendly governments "to form a
pre-emptive defensive strike" to rid the region of the threat to peace and
security posed by the situation in Grenada. The words themselves reinforce
the impression that the OECS thought it was acting under Article 8 of its
treaty, since Article 8 justifies the action it contemplates by referring to
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which deals with individual and
collective self-defense. As discussed more fully below (see "Individual and
Collective Self-Defense Under Article 51"), Article 51 permits an otherwise
unlawful use of force by a state or group of states "in the event an armed
attack occurs." These words appear to preclude anticipatory or pre-emptive
military strikes. While this interpretation has been challenged in some
quarters, the United States has declined to do so-and continues even now
to do so. This fact, too, may help explain the retreat from Article 8 reflected
in later statements by American officials after initial dependence on it.
At least two other aspects of the action taken by the OECS states have
drawn attention from international lawyers and should be noted at this
point. One is a technical issue that we find difficult to credit. It is that the
OECS Treaty cannot be invoked in justification for an otherwise unauthorized use of armed force because the treaty was never formally registered
with the United Nations Secretariat. Article 102(2) of the United Nations
Charter requires such registration as a condition precedent to a treaty's
being invoked by one of the parties to it before any organ of the United
Nations. Article 102 is designed to deprive secret pacts of standing in the
United Nations. The OECS Treaty, though obscure, was not secret. An
application for its registration had been sent to the United Nations Secretariat, had been returned by the Secretariat for technical shortcomings in the
application, and would and will in due course be registered as intended. The
suggestion that under these circumstances the OECS Treaty would be
denied standing within the United Nations does not appear to conform to
United Nations practice or equity.
The other, to which little attention has been paid thus far, is that the four
OECS states that actually contributed security forces to the October 25th
operation are associated with Barbados in a sub-regional security arrangement known informally as the Barbados Defence Force. Prime Minister
Adams referred to this arrangement, whose terms are still confidential, in
his October 26th radio address; so did the OECS Secretariat in its postinvasion statement. It seems reasonable to infer that the arrangement
played an important role. All but one (i.e., Jamaica) of the participating
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Caribbean states are parties to it. Unlike the OECS agreement, the confidential agreement establishing the Barbados Defence Force is said to contemplate intervention in the event one of the constituent governments is
overthrown by a coup d'etat. It may be significant, assuming it is true, that
the OECS meeting(s) on October 21st in Barbados is reported to represent
the first time the OECS had held a meeting outside the territory of one of its
member states."
If the Barbados Defence Force was a critical element in the operation, its
constituent instrument is relevant, too. But the terms of this instrument
remain secret; the instrument itself is unregistered. At very least, these
considerations make it more difficult for the interested states to rely upon it
in legal justification for their action. This may help explain the emphasis
placed upon the OECS Treaty and the initial confusion concerning the
provisions of this treaty under which the OECS was acting.
For the reasons adduced below, we are persuaded that the military action
initiated October 25th rests upon an unsteady legal foundation. The factors
cited thus far support this conclusion, but in our view they are not of the first
order of importance in reaching it.
B.

THE ACTION TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES

United States Ambassador J. William Middendorf II told the OAS
Permanent Council at its meeting on October 26th that the purposes of the
military intervention in Grenada were "[t]o restore law and order, to help
the people of Grenada restore functioning institutions of government, and
to facilitate the departures of those who wish to leave

. . .

From a strategic perspective, the government was concerned that Grenada would be used to launch or assist subversive activities in the Caribbean
and Central America. The build-up of weapons, the training and organizing
of armed forces, the construction of the air field at Port Salines large enough
to accommodate Soviet transport aircraft, and the likelihood that Grenada
was being used as a ground-based communications network linked with the
Soviet satellite system combined to make developments in Grenada a cause
for United States concern. The United States government has used evidence
obtained in the Grenadian intervention which support these concerns to
bolster popular support for the action. For the purposes of this report,
however, such evidence and the fears it substantiates do not bear directly on
the legal issues presented.36
34

See Manley, Grenada in the Context of History, 12 CARIBBEAN REV. 7, 45 (1983).
0AS Transcript, supra note 10, at 28.
36
The emphasis placed by the Administration on political developments in Grenada contributed to doubts that the reasons given publicly by the Administration for its involvement in
Grenada were sincere. As previously noted, United States hostility to the regime of Prime
35
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The legal rationale put forward by the United States in support of its
action rests upon three grounds, summarized here as it is in a letter to the
Chairman of this Committee, dated February 10, 1984, from Davis R.
Robinson, The Legal Adviser, Department of State:
The United States, both before and after the collective action, regarded three
well established legal principles as providing a solid legal basis for the action: (1)
the lawful governmental authorities of a State may invite the assistance in its
territory of military forces of other states or collective organizations in dealing
with internal disorder as well as external threats; (2) regional organizations have
competence to take measures to maintain international peace and security, consistent with the purposes and principles of the U.N. and OAS Charters; and (3) the
right of States to use force to protect their nationals.37
"I would emphasize," Mr. Robinson adds, "that the United States has not
taken a position as to whether any one of these grounds standing alone
would have provided adequate support for the action."
We turn now to a consideration of these legal grounds, as well as ones that
have been raised in support of the United States position though not by the
United States government itself.
III. Legal Restraints on the Use of Force in
International Relations
A.

BACKGROUND

The legal regulation of the use of armed force in international relations

has undergone profound change in this century. Prior to the adoption of the
Minister Bishop had been immediate and virtually unrelenting. At times it was evinced publicly
in pointed ways. According to press accounts, as early as 1981 U.S. naval forces staged
extensive exercises clearly aimed at signaling U.S. hostility towards Grenada. One involved a
mock invasion of an island off Puerto Rico, fictitiously named "Amber and the Amberdines"
and said to be "our enemy in the eastern Caribbean." See Manning, supra note 1, at 81-82. See
also OAS Transcript, supra note 10, at 7-8 (remarks of Ian Jacobs, Grenada's representative).
Mr. Jacobs took note of reports that had appeared in the Washington Post that in 1980 the
Central Intelligence Agency had developed plans to destabilize Mr. Bishop's regime. Id.
Throughout the spring of 1983, Grenadian officials repeatedly charged that the United States
was plotting to overthrow the Bishop regime. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, March 29, 1983, at A10;
N.Y. Times, April 5, 1983, at A3. Even while Mr. Bishop was in Washington in June seeking to
improve relations with the United States, he departed from the conciliatory tone of his public
statements briefly to charge that the CIA was plotting to overthrow his country and that it was
likely that a neighboring country would be used to launch an invasion against Grenada. N.Y.
Times, June 10, 1983, at A8. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
October 27th, Deputy Secretary Dam was asked by Senator Dodd whether the United States,
prior to the overthrow of the Bishop regime by the RMC, had made any plans to engage in an
invasion of Grenada. Mr. Dam replied that the Administration as such had no such plans,
although he could not say whether some contingency plan existed somewhere in the Pentagon.
Pressed by Senator Dodd, Secretary Dam said he himself was not familiar with any contingency
plan to overthrow the Bishop regime. See THE SITUATION IN GRENADA, supra note 4, at 31.
37
Letter from Mr. Robinson to Edward Gordon dated Feb. 10, 1984, attached as an annex to
this report. Mr. Robinson's letter was in response to a draft of this report and is published here
with his permission.
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Covenant of the League of Nations38 and the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (the Kellogg-Briand
Pact),39 resort to armed force by states was generally accepted as lawful. In
the absence of an international organ for enforcing existing legal rights of
states it supplied a crude means of self help. But it was also seen as a
legitimate means for attacking and altering existing legal rights of states,
independent of the merits of the attempted change.
The Covenant of the League broke with this legal tradition. Parties to the
Covenant undertook to "respect the territorial integrity and existing political independence" of other states and to submit to arbitration or inquiry by
the Council of the League such of their international disputes as could not be
settled by diplomacy.4" Similarly, states parties to the Kellogg-Briand pact
"condemn[ed] recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounce[d] it as an instrument of national policy in their
relations with one another."" They agreed that "settlement or solution of all
disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be,
which may arise among them shall never be sought except by pacific
means.

'

42

The trend toward delegitimation of armed force was reinforced by the
growing demand by the Latin American republics for adoption of a general
principle of nonintervention to govern relations among states in the western
hemisphere. As early as 1927 the Inter-American Commission of Jurists
proposed the principle that "no nation has a right to interfere in the internal
or foreign affairs of an American Republic against the will of the Republic." '43 This principle was subsequently adopted at the Seventh InternaIll

HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 1 (1931).
3946 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57, done at Paris, August 27, 1928.
4'Art. 10.
41
Art. I.
42
Art. II.
43
The United States initially opposed adoption of the principle. When it was formally
presented to the Sixth International Conference of American States, in Havana in 1928, the
United States delegate, former Secretary of State Hughes, commented:
Let us face the facts. The difficulty, if there is any, in any one of the American Republics, is
not of any external aggression. It is an internal difficulty, if it exists at all. From time to time
there arises a situation most deplorable and regrettable in which sovereignty is not at work, in
which for a time in certain areas there is not government at all, in which for a time and with a
limited sphere there is no possibility of performing the functions of sovereignty and independence. Those are the conditions that create the difficulty with which at times we find
ourselves confronted. What are we to do when government breaks down and American
citizens are in danger of their lives? ... I am not speaking of sporadic acts of violence, or of
the rising of mobs, or of those distressing incidents which may occur in any country however
well administered. I am speaking of the occasions where government itself is unable to
function for a time because of difficulties which confront it and which it is impossible to
surmount.
Now it is a principle of international law that in such a case a government is fully justified in
taking action-I would call it interposition of a temporary character-for the purpose of
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tional Conference of American States, in Montevideo in 1933 (with United

States reservations), and again at the Inter-American Conference for the
Maintenance of Peace, in Buenos Aires in 1936 (without United States
reservations)." At the latter conference, the American states declared as
"inadmissible the intervention of any one of them, directly or indirectly, and
for whatever reason, in the internal or external affairs of any other of the
Parties..." Towards the end of World War II, this principle was reiterated
in the so-called Act of Chapultepec, adopted by the Inter-American Confer-

ence on Problems of War and Peace early in 1945. 4' By this time, it had
become one of the basic organizing principles of the inter-American system.

Thus, by the time the United Nations Charter was drafted at San Francisco later that year, the unilateral resort to armed force had been deprived
of much of its prior legitimacy in international law. The Charter both reflects
and codifies this change. Its preamble states the determination of the members of the United Nations "to save succeeding generations from the scourge
of war" and "to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of

methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest."
Article 2(3) requires all members to "settle their international disputes by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and
justice, are not endangered." More specifically, Article 33 obliges "the
parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security" to "first of all, seek a

solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judi-

protecting the lives and property of its nationals. I could say that this is not intervention ....
Of course, the United States cannot forego its right to protect its citizens. International law
cannot be changed by the resolutions of this Conference ...
Report of the Delegate of the United States of America to the Sixth International Conference
of American States, Washington, 1928, pp. 14-15, quoted in inter alia, H.P. DEVRIES & J.
RODRIGUES-NovAs, THE LAW OF THE AMERICAS 17-18 (1965). See also I. BROWNLIE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 293 (1963).
"Article 8 of the Convention on Rights and Duties of States, adopted at Montevideo,
contained a provision that "No state has the right to invervene in the internal or external affairs
of another," i.e., the very words that had been proposed by the Inter-American Commission of
Jurists in 1927 and rejected by the United States at the Havana Conference in 1928. Ian
Brownlie comments: "American acceptance of this text was thus prima facie evidence of a
withdrawal of the claim to a right of intervention to protect the lives and property of nationals."
BROWNLIE, supra note 43 at 97.
The United States reservation was ambiguous. It said that in the absence of a common
standard of definition of the principle of nonintervention, the United States would construe it in
the light of "the doctrines and policies ... embodied in the different addresses of President
Roosevelt ... and in the law of nations as generally recognized and accepted." International
Conference of American States, First Supplement, 1933-40, Conv. on Rights and Duties of
States, 124 (1940), cited in Falk, American Intervention in Cuba and the Rule of Law, 22 OHIO
ST. L.J. 546, 552-53 (1961). See also DEVRIES & RODRIGUEZ supra note 43, at 18.
45
Resolution on Reciprocal Assistance and American Solidarity, T.I.A.S. 1543 (1945). See 12
DEP'T ST. BULL. 339 (1945); 39 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 108 (1945).
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cial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."
Article 24 of the Charter contains the nub of the system of collective
peace-keeping the Charter creates. In it, United Nations members "co fer
on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of irternational peace and security." Article 2(4) is its prescriptive counterpart. It
provides:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
B.

ARTICLE

2(4)

OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

These words represent the basic norm of contemporary international law
with respect to the use of force. Their historic dimensions were recognized
from the outset. As Professor Louis Henkin has written:
For the first time, nations tried to bring within the realm of law those ultimate
political tensions and interests that had long been deemed beyond control by law.
They determined that even sincere concern for national "security" or "vital
interests" should no longer warrant any nation to initiate war. They agreed, in
effect, to forgo the use of external force to change the political status quo. Nations
would be assured their fundamental independence, the enjoyment of their territory, their freedom-a kind of right to be left alone. With it, of course, came the
corresponding obligation to let others alone, not to use force to resolve disputes,
or even to vindicate one's "rights." Change-other than internal change through
internal forces-would have to be achieved peacefully, by agreement .
However reasonable these aspirations may have seemed to the framers of
the Charter, they have not been realized. For one thiing, the normative
language of Article 2(4) has invited varying, usually self-serving, interpretations because of the words which follow "use of force." In his classic treatise,
the late Sir Hersch Lauterpacht noted that the words "against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state" were added to the Charter
at the San Francisco conference at the instance of some smaller states, not to
weaken the obligation otherwise prescribed, but to strengthen it. "Territorial integrity," he wrote, "especially where coupled with 'political independence,' is synonymous with territorial inviolability." That is, the obligation
has been breached even if the attacking state has no intention of interfering
permanently with the territorial integrity of the invaded state. 7
46

How NATIONS BEHAVE 137 (2d ed. 1979).
LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 154 (7th ed. 1952); also I. BROWNLIE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 266-68 (1963); Waldock, The Regulation
of the Use of Force by Individual States in InternationalLaw, 81 RECUEIL DES COURs 451, 493
(1952, II); L. GOODRICH & E. HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED STATES: COMMENTARY AND
DOCUMENTS 103, 104-5 (2d ed. 1949). See, e.g., D'Amato, Israel'sAir Strike Upon the Iraqi
Nuclear Reactor, 77 AM. J. INT'L. L. 584, 585 (1983). Cf. Gordon, The World Court and the
Interpretationof Constitutive Treaties, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 794 (1965).
L.

HENKIN,

H.
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Professor Lauterpacht also noted, however, that the phrase added at the
instance of the smaller states was "a reminder that excess precision may
result in weakening the intended object of the law." 48 His point has been
borne out by interpretations of Article 2(4) which discount its negotiating
history and tend either to minimize the significance of the words "or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations" or to
treat them as justification for the use of armed force in furtherance of one of
the Charter's other principal objectives-for example, self-determination,
human rights, and discouraging preparations for acts of international
aggression."

The net effect of interpretations such as these is to weaken the constraints
of Article 2(4) and, not coincidently, to detract from the Security Council's
primary responsibility for peacekeeping. Advocates say it is necessary in
light of the failure of the Security Council to carry out this responsibility. It is
supported, they contend, by the tacit approval which otherwise extraordinary uses of armed force have received from members of the United Nations
in recent years. This approval must be inferred, usually, since it is not
reflected in resolutions of the General Assembly or other more or less
formal manifestations of the constructions given to the Charter by United
Nations members. As noted below ("Current Legal Effect of These Provisions"), in a formal, positivist sense these constitutional conventions or tacit
understandings fall far short of being amendments to the Charter. In terms
of policy, the issue is whether what is gained by accommodating the language of the Charter to perceived international realities is equal to what is
lost both by lowering the legal barrier to the use of force and by lowering the
public's expectations concerning the reality of law in relation to the use of
force.
This is true as well of attempts to portray Article 2(4) as merely one
among several contending policy objectives of the Charter. Thus seen,
Article 2(4) constraints on the use of force are not as absolute as they
appear, and as the drafting history of the Charter might lead one to believe.
They are, rather, simply principles of coequal force with the Charter's
prescriptions pertaining to self-determination, human rights, etc., such that
in any individual case Article 2(4) and these other policies must be weighedagainst one another."
"Ild.
at 154n.
49
Cf., Meeker,
50

Defensive Quarantine and the Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L 515 (1963).
See Sohn, Gradationsof Intervention in Internal Conflicts, 13 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 225,
229 (1983). In her statement to the United Nations Security Council on October 27th, Ambassador Kirkpatrick said:
The prohibitions against the use of force in the United Nations Charter are contextual, not
absolute. They provide ample justification for the use of force in pursuit of the other values
also inscribed in the Charter-freedom, democracy, peace ....
83 DEP'T ST. BULL. 74 (1983).
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The bare truth of the problem probably lies in Professor Thomas Franck's
observation a few years ago that "the high-minded resolve of Article 2(4)
mocks us from the grave."' The reasons for its unsteady reign are not
difficult to discern: i.e., "the mistaken original assumption of Big-Power
unanimity; the changing character of war; the loopholes for 'self-defense'
and 'regional' action [see below]; the lack of impartial means to find and
characterize facts; the disposition of nations to take law into their own hands
and destroy and mangle it to their own purpose."52
C.

ARTICLE

20 -OF THE OAS

CHARTER

As noted, the principle of nonintervention is deeply engrained in interAmerican relations and law. Article 20 of the OAS Charter, 3 adopted in
1948, provides:
The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily,
of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State,
directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever.
Former Legal Adviser Abram Chayes observed recently that the unequivocal terms of Article 20 (which was Article 17 of the OAS Charter as
originally adopted) "are not empty, do-good pieties. They are the quid pro
quo extracted by the Latin American countries from the United States in
return for their participation in the collective defense of the Hemisphere.
They wanted to make sure that the alliance would not provide a pretext for
the kind of military intervention that had been the hallmark of the United
'
States' Latin American policy." 54
Any doubts about the inclusiveness of Article 20 are dispelled by Article
18 (originally Article 15), which states:
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for
any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The
foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of
interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its
political, economic, and cultural elements.

And again Article 21 (originally 18) provides:
The American States bind themselves in their international relations not to have
5

Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? or: ChangingNorms Governingthe Use of Forceby States,
64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970).
5
"Henkin, The Reports of the DeathofArticle 2(4) Are Greatly Exaggerated,65 AM. J. INT'L L.
544 (1971), summarizing Franck, supra note 51.
532U.S.T.2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force for the United States
Dec. 13, 1951, as amended by Protocol of Amendment, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847,
entered into force for the United States Feb. 27, 1970.
54
Chayes, Op-ed piece, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1983, at A35. See also Akehurst, Enforcement
Action by Regional Agencies, With Special Reference to the Organizationof American States, 42
BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 175 (1967).
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recourse to the use of force, except in the case of self-defense in accordance with
existing treaties or in fulfillment thereof.

The OAS Charter must be read in conjunction with the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 (the Rio Treaty),55 which replaced
and strengthened the Act of Chapultepec, supra, and applies to virtually all
of the western hemisphere, including the Caribbean Sea (Article 4). The
United States is a party to both the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty.
The Rio Treaty was designed "to assure peace, through adequate means,
to provide for effective reciprocal assistance to meet armed attacks against
any American state, and ... to deal with threats of aggression against any of
them." It provides for collective action, not only in case of an armed attack
(covered in Article 3), but also "if the inviolability or the integrity of the
territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American state
should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an
extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America

. .

." (Article 6).

In such cases, the Rio Treaty says, the Organ of Consultation, consisting
of the Foreign Ministers of the member states, or representatives specifically
designated for the purpose, is to "meet immediately in order to agree on the
measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of
the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for
the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of
the Continent" (Article 6). Among the measures which the Organ of Consultation may take is "the use of armed force" (Article 8). Parties to the Rio
Treaty "undertake in their international relations not to resort to the threat
or the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations or of this Treaty" (Article 1).
The Treaty authorizes the use of armed force in only two circumstances:
individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter (Article 3) and, as already noted, when agreed to by the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs as a form of assistance to a victim of aggression (Article 8,
incorporating Article 6).
At the Extraordinary Session of the Permanent Council of the OAS on
October 26th, the day after the invasion, some Latin American states
condemned the action in strong terms. The representative of Colombia
called it "an open violation of the principle of nonintervention. 5 6 The
representative of Mexico said his government "does not believe the armed
intervention constitutes a solution justified by [ajustada a] the norms of
international law." 57 The representative of Argentina said categorically that
55
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 62 Stat. 1681; T.I.A.S. No. 1838. See 43
AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 53 (1949).
56
OAS Transcript, supra note 10, at 11.
171d. at 13.
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the states that had invaded Grenada had violated Articles 18 and 20 of the
OAS Charter. 8 In the guarded language of diplomacy, other representatives of Latin American countries regretted the action and the failure of the
United States and Caribbean states to resolve the matter peacefully through
the OAS.
As Mr. Robinson's letter indicates, the United States government takes
the position that its action was consistent with Articles 22 and 28 of the OAS
Charter. Article 22 (originally 19) says that "measures taken for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing treaties" do not
constitute a violation of the principles set forth in Articles 18 and 20, supra.
Article 28 provides that, in the circumstances described in Article 6 of the
Rio Treaty, supra (i.e., aggression other than armed attack), "the American
States, in furtherance of the principles of continental solidarity or collective
self-defense, shall apply the measures and procedures established in the
special treaties on the subject."
In essence, the United States position is that United States-Caribbean
Peace-Keeping Force was a collective security measure taken pursuant to an
"existing treaty" (Article 22), a "special treaty" (Article 28).19 This interpretation is not supported by the travauxpreparatoiresof the OAS Charter.
(See infra, "Collective Action Under Articles 52 and 53 of the United
Nations Charter and Articles 22 and 28 of the OAS Charter").
D.

CURRENT LEGAL EFFECT OF THESE PROVISIONS

Among the arguments not raised by the United States government but
offered by others in the course of public discussion of the United States
involvement in Grenada is one that says that, in light of frequent violations
of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter and the emergence of unanticipated forms of international aggression, states are legally justified in falling
back to their prior practice of unilateral forcible self-help. The argument is
not new. It was advanced as early as the 1950s, when two scholars wrote:
"[I]f the collective organization, through a fault in its organizing instrument,
leaves a gap where the use of force is necessary but the collective organization is impotent to act, then the legal right to use force must, in such
instance, revert back to the members." ' Again in 1963, in defense of the
United States quarantine of Cuba, another writer observed:
The Charter of the United Nations is a treaty, binding as such upon the United
States. But what if the treaty has been consistently and at times flagrantly violated
5

11d. at 17.
' 91n his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 27th, Deputy
Secretary Dam said that OAS Charter "envisions" collective action under treaties other than
the Rio Treaty: "So in a sense you have an OAS Force, but it is under the security provisions of
the OAS envisaging collective defense and security." THE SITUATION IN GRANADA, supra note 4,
at 35-36.
'A. V. THOMAS AND A. J. THOMAS, JR., NON-INTERVENTION 209 (1956).
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by the Soviet Union, and the veto of the Soviet Union has been used to defeat
decisions of the Security Council? How much of collective security is left in the
situation of 'co-existence' in which we have lived with the Soviet Union for the past
fifteen years? Must the United States continue to respect obligations and follow
procedures when the other party to the contract violates them? Traditional
international law is about as clear as it could be in recognizing the mutuality of
contractual obligations."

To the extent that this position bespeaks the need to formally revise the
Charter to conform to patterns of mutual compliance, it is political and
prospective and need not be considered at this point. But its apparent
plausibility as a legal basis for denying the continuing validity of existing
treaty obligations does merit immediate attention. It is of course true that
good sense and equity rebel at the idea of a state being held to the performance of its obligations under a treaty which other contracting parties are
refusing to respect. 6' But it is essential to the preservation of the stability of
treaties, upon which so many international rights are based, that the unilateral right to assert the invalidity of treaty obligations be carefully
circumscribed.

6
1

Customary international law, especially (but not only) as codified in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, ' presumes that every treaty is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed in good faith .65 Certain
circumstances, including that of material breach of a treaty, may justify
formally abandoning it. 66 But the only relevant grounds short of abandon6

Fenwick, The QuarantineAgainst Cuba: Legal or Illegal?, 57 AM. J.

62

INT'L L.

588 (1963).

See comments of Professor Waldock, Special Rapporteur, International Law Commission,
1963
63 (It) Yb. I.L.C. 73.

Schwelb, Termination or Suspension of the Operation of a Treaty as a Consequence of its
Breach, 7 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 309, 312 (1967).
'U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), reprintedin 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969). The Vienna

Convention, adopted in 1969, does not purport to apply to treaties previously concluded.
Article 4. In matters relevant to the instant study, however, the Convention appears to codify
and reflect customary international law.
61Article 26 codifies the rule known as pacta sunt servanda.
'Articles 46-52. The term "material breach" is defined, for the purposes of the Convention,
as "a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the ... Convention," or "the violation of a
provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty." Id., art.
60(3). See also the discussion of "fundamental change of circumstances," below. Originally,
the Special Rapporteur had suggested limiting the unilateral right of denunciation to cases of
"fundamental breach," which was defined by him as "a breach of the treaty in an essential
respect, going to the root or foundation of the treaty relationship between the parties, and
calling in question the continued value or possibility of that relationship in the particular field
covered by the treaty." Fitzmaurice, Second Report, A/CN.4/107,1957 (11) Y.B. I. L.C. 31. His
successor as Special Rapporteur, Sir Humphrey Waldock, preferred the word "material,"
explaining that "the word 'fundamental' might be understood as meaning that only the
violation of a provision directly touching the central purposes of the treaty can ever justify the
other party in terminating the treaty. But other provisions considered by a party to be essential
to the effective execution of the treaty may have been very material in inducing it to enter the
treaty at all, even though these provisions may be of an entirely ancilliary character." Waldock,
Second Report, 1963 (It) Y.B. I.L.C. 75. See the discussion of "changed circumstances,"
below.
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ment for asserting the invalidity of an existing treaty go merely to the
question of whether a state validly consented to be bound by it in the first

place. 67 It strains credulity to think that the United States or any other
original signatory to the United Nations Charter could claim, nearly forty
years after its adoption, that its consent had been invalidly obtained.
Article 48 of the Vienna Convention does recognize the right of a state to
invoke an error in a treaty as invalidating its consent to be bound by it, "if
the error relates to a fact or situation which was assumed by that state to exist
at the time when the treaty was concluded and formed an essential basis of
its consent to be bound" by it. But not "if the state in question contributed

by its own conduct to the error or if the circumstances were such as to put
that state on notice of a possible error." International decisions support the
conclusion that a state which has benefited from the Charter cannot belatedly interpose the failure of consideration as a ground for invalidating its
consent to be bound by it. 6"
1. FundamentalChange of Circumstances
(Rebus Sic Stantibus)
Prior to the Vienna Convention, states had frequently asserted the doctrine known as rebus sic stantibus either as a tacit assumption or clause
(clausula rebus sic stantibus) or as an independent rule of treaty interpretation for carrying the intention of the parties into effect. It was said to
encapsulate the idea that "the obligations of a treaty may terminate when a

change occurs in those circumstances which existed at the time of the
conclusion of the treaty and whose continuance formed, according to the
intention or will of the parties, a condition of the continuing validity of the

treaty." 69 As frequently as it was asserted, the doctrine's legitimacy was
67

Vienna Convention, arts. 42-45.
'In the Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom/Iceland) case, [1973] I.C.J. REP. 3, Iceland
unsuccessfully contended that because of changes in international law that had occurred since
the 1961 Anglo-Icelandic treaty upon which the United Kingdom was basing its claim the
consideration provided by the United Kingdom in the conclusion of that treaty, namely the
giving up of its right to fish within twelve miles of the Icelandic coast, no longer constituted
consideration at all. The Court rejected this contention "on the basis that, although some of the
motives which prompted Iceland to enter into the treaty may have become less compelling or
may even have disappeared, this was no ground for repudiating other parts of the treaty the
purpose of which had remained unchanged." D.W. GRIEG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 507 (2d ed.
1976). The Court observed:
[I]n the case of a treaty which is in part executed and in part executory, in which one of the
parties has already benefited from the executed provisions of the treaty, it would be
particularly inadmissible to allow that party to put an end to obligations which were accepted
under the treaty by way of quid pro quo for the provisions which the other party has already
executed.
69
C. Hill, The Doctrineof "Rebus Sic Stantibus" in InternationalLaw, University of Missouri
Studies, IX (1934), quoted in H. BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 917 (2d ed. 1952).
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challenged," its applied meaning was a subject of continuing controversy
and its effect on the stability of treaties was deplored. Indeed, when the
International Law Commission began drafting a rebussic stantibus provision
for the Vienna Convention, several governments, including the United
States, expressed concern that unless the principle was carefully circumscribed too much political latitude would be available to a state wishing to
avoid its treaty obligations."
The final version of the Convention does not mention the phrase rebus sic
stantibus at all, referring only to a "fundamental change of circumstances"
that was unforeseen at the time a treaty was concluded, where the unforeseen circumstances constitute "an essential basis of the consent of the
parties to be bound by the treaty" and where the effect of the change is
"radically to transform" the extent of obligations still to be performed under
the treaty.72 The ILC was anxious to avoid the implication that the doctrine
as thus enunciated comprehends mere noncompliance with a treaty. It was
anticipated that such an interpretation would have the effect of validating
deprivations of rights protected by humanitarian treaties that were being
abused, in which event "the effects of the illegality would then be visited
upon innocent persons." 3 The same reasoning would appear to apply with
equal vigor to treaties or treaty provisions restricting the use of armed force
in international relations.
In any event, under the Convention a fundamental change of circumstances may be invoked only as grounds for terminating or suspending the
operation of a treaty, not for impeaching its continuing validity without
formally abandoning it.
2. Disuse or Obsolescence
The Vienna Convention makes no mention at all of disuse or obsolescence as a grounds either for invalidating or abandoning a treaty. The
omission was deliberate. In connection with its final draft in 1966, the ILC
noted that "while 'obsolescence' or 'desuetude' may be a factual cause of the
termination of a treaty, the legal basis of such termination, when it occurs, is
the consent of the parties to abandon the treaty, which is to be implied from
their conduct in relation to the treaty." 7 Consequently, even if the obsoles7

British writers were particularly reluctant to accept the principle. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 599 (2d ed. 1973). In the Free Zones case, P.C.I.J. Ser. A,
No. 24 (1930) and P.C.I.J. Ser. A/B, No. 46 (1932), the Permanent Court of International
Justice implicitly accepted the principle while expressing doubts about whether it existed.
7
The United States Government objected that, even as limited in the ILC's draft to
fundamental changes of circumstances, the doctrine was "too liable to the abuse of subjective
interpretation." Comments of United States Government, 1966 (I) Y.B. I.L.C., at 40.
72

Vienna Convention, art. 62.

"Comments of Prof. Waldock, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR. 832, para. 23.
U41966 (II) Y.B. I.L.C., at 237. Prof. Grieg notes that "the need for the parties to adopt some
view towards 'obsolete' treaties was recognized by Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of
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cence of the Charter, or of its prohibition of armed force, could be shown to
have reached the proportions sometimes claimed, it would take the formal
abandonment of the Charter by the parties to justify the conclusion that its
legal obligations have lapsed because of disuse or obsolescence. In fact,
however, state practice simply will not support a finding of abandonment,
however frequently states may depart from the norms of national behavior
directed by the Charter, especially in light of the fact that even in the most
blatant instances of abuse of Article 2(4) the state concerned has generally
attempted to justify its use of force in terms of the overall pattern of
behavior permitted by the Charter.
3. Impossibility of Performance

Closely akin to the fundamental change of circumstances justification for
terminating a treaty is that of impossibility of performance. The two are
treated separately in the Vienna Convention, with the impossibility argument even more narrowly circumscribed than the fundamental change of
circumstances one. In any event, it too constitutes grounds for terminating a
treaty under limited circumstances, but not for treating its obligations as
having lapsed."
4. Subsequent Practiceas a Basis for
Inferring a De Facto Amendment of Article 2(4)

In the debate over the United States involvement in Grenada, renewed
attention has been accorded the argument that, although state practice
subsequent to the adoption of the United Nations Charter has not resulted
in the abandonment of its obligations regarding the use of force, it does
manifest a reinterpretation or de facto amendment of these obligations by
the parties to the Charter, i.e., a tacit understanding or "constitutional
convention."
Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention provides that in the interpretation
of treaties "there shall be taken into account, together with the context[,J (a)
Nations, which empowered the Assembly to 'advise the reconsideration' by Members of the
League of Treaties that were 'inapplicable'." D.W. GRIEo. supra note 68, at 508n.
The subject arose, with the ILC's view noted and affirmed, in the joint dissenting opinion of
Judges Onyeama, Dillard, Arechaga and Waldock in the 1974 Nuclear Tests (Australia/
France) case. [19741 I.C.J. Rep. 253. Australia had based its contention that the Court had
jurisdiction to hear the case in part upon a jurisdictional clause in the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact,
supra. France responded that the Pact was no longer in force, inter alia because of "the
desuetude into which it has fallen since the demise of the League of Nations system." The Court
did not reach the question, having decided on other grounds that it lacked jurisdiction. But the
four dissenting judges, one of whom (Waldock) had been the Special Rapporteur responsible
for drafting the relevant portion of the Vienna Convention, rejected France's argument
outright. Recalling the reasons for the omission of reference to disuse or obsolescence, they
noted that in the instant case, whereas the conduct of the parties to the pact had been
spasmodic, it tended to show the Pact's continued operation, not its abandonment. Id. at
337-344 (joint dissenting opinion).
75
Vienna Convention, art. 61.
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any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the treaty or the
application of its provisions . . .[and] (b) any subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties

regarding its interpretation." There is some support for the contention that
law-declaring resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly represent "authentic" interpretation by the parties to the Charter of their existing
treaty obligations.76 Even accepting this still controversial contention," it
would be difficult to find in the resolutions adopted by the United Nations

General Assembly anything that supports the idea that the members of the
United Nations have sought to modify the obligations contained in Article
2(4) .78
It has been suggested that even if it has not been amended, in practice
Article 2(4) has been superseded by new norms of international behavior
which reflect contemporary expectations of how Article 2(4) ought to be
applied in practice. It is not easy to evaluate this assertion. Noncompliance
with a legal norm does not, without more, evince an intention by states to
prescribe a new one. Moreover, such state practice as might be offered in
evidence of the emergence of a new legal norm cannot be said to possess
anything like the necessary degree of uniformity, frequency and acknowledgement that it is motivated by opinio juris communis. In fact, it is probably appropriate to note at this point that the degree of compliance with
Article 2(4) is far greater than that of noncompliance, although it is obviously also more difficult to demonstrate inasmuch as a decision not to use
armed force does not readily lend itself to formal proof. In any event, the
introduction of a new norm in direct contradiction with the terms of an
existing codified one should not lightly be inferred.79
76
See, e.g., Castaneda, The Underdeveloped Nations and the Development of International
Law, 15 INT'L ORG. 38, 46-48 (1961); Lachs The Law in and of the United Nations, 1 INDIAN J.
INT'L L. 429, 439 (1961); R. Higgins, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE
POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1963); Schachter, The Relation of Law, Politicsand
Action in the United Nations, 109 RECUEIL DES COURS 165,185-88 (1963-II). The framers of the
Charter recognized that interpretation of the Charter is "inherent in the functioning of any
body which operates under an instrument defining its functions and powers." Statement of
Committee 11/2 of the San Francisco Conference, 13 U.N.C.I.O. 709-711 (1945).
"In a formal, positivist sense interpretation of the Charter by action of one of its political
organs cannot constitute an amendment of the Charter unless it meets the formal requirements
for amendment set forth in Chapter XVIII of the Charter. The point need not be pursued here,
however, inasmuch as the members of the UN do not appear to have intended to amend or
reinterpret Article 2(4). See generally Schachter, The Crisis of Legitimation in the United
Nations, 50 NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR INTERNATIONAL RET 3 (1981).
78
See Clark, HumanitarianIntervention: Help to Your Friends And State Practice, 13 GA. J.
INT'L & COMp. L. 211, 212 (1983). Relevant resolutions tend to trace the language of the
Charter. See, for example, the Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (Oct. 24, 1970), 25 GAOR, Supp. 28, A/8028, at 122-124.
79
See Henkin, Force, Intervention, and Neutrality in Contemporary InternationalLaw, 1963
PRocs. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 147, 149.
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IV. Countervailing Provisions and Policies
The United Nations Charter, like many multilateral constitutive instruments, is a product of political compromise. The aspirations it reflects and
espouses are ultimately in harmony with one another, but in codifying
principles and machinery for their implementation the framers had to
accommodate positions that were not always logically or practically consistent. Some of these accommodations involve the Rio Treaty and OAS
Charter and figure directly in the issue of the lawfulness of the U.S. involvement in Grenada.

A.

INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE
UNDER ARTICLE

51

The most prominent of these permits the use of force in self-defense,
either by a state itself or by states acting collectively. A number of commentators have assumed, and at least one has insisted, that the military intervention in Grenada was justified as a valid exercise of this legal right. International law has long recognized-indeed, perhaps taken for granted-the
right of states to defend themselves. But the scope of this right under the
United Nations Charter is more limited than popular discussion of it suggests.
Neither the Covenant of the League nor the Kellogg-Briand Pact referred
explicitly to the right of self-defense. In proposing the Pact, however, the
French and American governments expressed the view that a right of
self-defense "is inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit in every
treaty.". "Every nation," the United States government said, "is free at all
times and regardless of treaty provisions to defend its territory from attack
or invasion and it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances
require recourse to war in self-defense. If it has a good case, the world will
applaud and not condemn its action."'" The United States explained the
omission of any reference to self-defense in the proposed Pact by saying that
its inclusion would make it "too easy for the unscrupulous to mold events to
accord with an agreed definition." 82
The United Nations Charter appears to represent a different approach to
the right of self-defense. Article 51 of the Charter expressly recognizes ("in
no way impairs") the "inherent right" of individual or collective self-defense
"ifan armed attack occurs," at least until the Security Council takes measures to restore what the Charter refers to as "international peace and
"'1928 United States Foreign Relations, I, 36.
81

82IN.

1d.
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security." Self-defense of this sort, whether individual or collective, cannot
be construed as a threat or use of force in volation of Article 2(4).
The reference in Article 51 to an "armed attack" appears to represent an
unqualified condition, and it was initially interpreted as a limitation upon
whatever "inherent right" a state otherwise possesses. Thus, in 1948 Philip
Jessup wrote that
A case could be made out for self-defense under the traditional law where the
injury was threatened but no attack had yet taken place. Under the Charter,
alarming military preparations by a neighboring state would justify a resort to the
Security Council, but would not8justify
resort to anticipatory force by the state
3
which believed itself threatened.
But as Jessup noted, the documentary record of the discussions at the San
Francisco Conference which formally drafted the Charter does not afford
conclusive evidence that the words "armed attack" were intended to narrow
or preclude the traditional right of anticipatory or preventive self-defense.!
Some legal scholars have argued that the reference in Article 51 to a state's
inherent right should be construed as reaffirmation of the traditional rule.
"The proponents of a [restrictive] interpretation substitute for the words 'if
an armed attack occurs' the very different words 'if, and only if, an armed
attack occurs,' "Professor Myres McDougal has written. 5 "There is not the
slightest evidence that the framers of the United Nations Charter by inserting one provision which expressly reserves a right of self-defense, had the
intent of imposing by this provision new limitations upon the traditional
86
right of states.
However, most scholars do not agree with this reading. Indeed, they
regard anticipatory self-defense, in situations where no attack is imminent,
as incompatible with Article 2(4)'s constraints on the use of force and feel
that the very subjectivity of an anticipated attack renders it too manipulable
a standard to have been intended by the framers as an exception to Article
83
P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 166 (1948). See also Kunz, Individualand Collective
Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charterof the United Nations, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 872, 873

(1947);

KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 269 (1950); 2 LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW 156 (7th ed. 1952); Wright, United States Intervention in the Lebanon,

53 J.

INT'L

L. 112, 116 (1959).
note 83, at 166.

84JESSUP, supra
85

McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J.

INT'L

L. 597, 600

(1963). See Professor Henkin's response, supra note 79, at 165-66.
'McDougal, supra note 85, at 600. See also McDOUAL AND FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, ch. 3 (1961). This view appears strengthened by the fact that the French
text is "dans un cas ou un Membre des Nations Unies est l'objet d'agression arm~e." The words
"agression arm~e" appear to be less categorical in French than "armed attack" is in English.
See Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in InternationalLaw,
81 RECEUIL DES COURs 455, 495 (1952, II). Similarly, Mallison, Limited Naval Blockade or
Quarantine-Interdiction:Nationaland Collective Self-Defense Claims Valid Under International
Law, 31 GEO. WASH. U. L. REV. 335, 361 (1962). Cf. MacChesney, Some Comments on the
'Quarantine' of Cuba, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 592, 596 (1963).
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2(4) (in contrast to the comparatively objective standard of an armed attack
that has already taken place).87
The traditional right of anticipatory self-defense was by no means unrestricted in any event. The rule usually cited was framed by Secretary of State
Daniel Webster in the course of diplomatic resolution of the dispute engendered by the destruction by British forces of the American steamer The
Caroline in 1842, while that vessel was berthed in her American port. The
British had learned that The Caroline had been chartered by insurgent
forces in Canada and that it was loaded with arms which were about to be
delivered to the insurgents. Webster insisted its destruction and the consequent death of several crew members were in principle illegal, and he added:
[W]hile it is admitted that exceptions growing out of the great law of self-defense
do exist, those exceptions should be confined to cases in which the necessity of that
self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no
moment for deliberation, and must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly
within it."
If this traditional criterion of imminence and overwhelming necessity"leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation"-is borne in
mind, the case for armed intervention as an exercise of legitimate anticipatory self-defense usually proves to be weak, and such appears to be the case

with regard to Grenada. As a military or other policy matter, the time for
intervention may have been ripe. That the military buildup on Grenada
genuinely alarmed its Caribbean neighbors is unquestionable, as is their

vulnerability to armed aggression and their need, when threatened, to rely
on outside help. But as a matter of law the imminence of the threat of armed
attack-the sine qua non of the legal right of preventive self-defense even

under the traditional rule-does not seem to have been of such compelling
moment that there was no time for nonforcible alternatives. 9

87

Henkin, supra note 79, at 141. See also 2

m2 MOORE,

LAUTERPACHT,

supra note 83, at 156.

412 (1906). Cited with approval by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1945. See 2 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 83, at 190.
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89

Members of Congress clearly doubted that the use of force was the last option pursued. See

THE SITUATION IN GRENADA, supra note 4, at 17

(question by Senator Kassebaum); and
Markup before

GRENADA WAR POWERS: FULL COMPLIANCE REPORTING AND IMPLEMENTATION,

the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1983) (remarks of Cong. Mel
Levine). At the meeting of the OAS Permanent Council on October 26th, the representative of
the Bahamas described the military operation as a case of "premature overreaction." OAS
Transcript, supra note 10, at 31.
In a leading treatise, Professor Derek Bowett of Cambridge University observes:
The essence of self-defence is a wrong done, a breach of a legal duty owed to the state acting
in self-defence ... The breach of a duty violates a substantive right, for example, the right of
territorial integrity, and gives rise to the right of self-defence. It is this precondition of
delictual conduct which distinguishes self-defence from the "right" of self-preservation and
the "right of necessity."
BOWErT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
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It may well be argued that Webster's classic definition of the circumstances that justify anticipatory self-defense has undergone change; that is,
that the "inherent" right of states, always a matter of customary international law, has been modified by post-Charter customary law. Professor
Rostow argues as much, saying that "the decisions of states to use force
under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter [are] almost always a
conditioned reflex under circumstances of stress. Their legality is not determined by how well they are explained, however, but by how well they
correspond to the pattern of state practice deemed right by the society of
nations."'
It should be noted that as early as 1946 the United States government
offered as its formal view that "an 'armed attack' is now something entirely
different from what it was prior to the discovery of atomic weapons."'" And,
speaking of the effect of new techniques of warfare, the late Hans Kelsen
wrote in 1954 that
[T]he members of the United Nations in exercising their right of individual and
collective self-defense may interpret "armed attack" to mean not only an action in
which a state uses its own armed force but also a revolutionary movement which
takes place in one state but which is initiated or supported by another state. In this
case, the members could come to the assistance of the legitimate government
against which the revolutionary movement is directed.92

In the Grenada situation, assertions have been made, alternatively and
sometimes without distinction, that Grenada was acting in its own selfdefense, that the OECS states that participated in the intervention were

acting collectively in their own self-defense, and that Grenada, the OECS
and other Caribbean states, and the United States were acting in their
combined right of collective self-defense. To the extent that Grenada's
self-defense is involved, these assertions assume, against the weight of
present evidence, that the coup that brought the Revolutionary Military
Council headed by Army Chief General Hudson Austin to power was
instigated or supported by Cuba. They further assume that the Revolutionary Council failed to achieve de facto control of the island and that therefore
and in any event the Governor-General of Grenada was authorized to act in
Grenada's behalf, that the Governor-General requested the OECS to
1E. V. Rostow, Law 'Is Not a Suicide Pact,' Op-ed piece, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1983,
at A35.
9
United States Memorandum No. 3, Dealing with the Relations Between the Atomic
Development Authority and the Organs of the United Nations, submitted to Subcommittee
No. 1 of the UN Atomic Energy Commission, July 12, 1946, International Control of Atomic
Energy; Growth of a Policy (Dep't State Publication 2702, 1946), Appendix No. 16, quoted in 5
WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

980. Cf. W.

FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE

259-260 (1964).

'Kelsen, Collective Security Under InternationalLaw, United States Naval War College,

International Law Studies, 1954 (1957), at 88, quoted in 5WHITEMAN,
LAW 981.

DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
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intervene in the way it did before the fact, and that the help sought by the
OECS from the United States and other Caribbean states was consistent
with the Governor General's request.
These assumptions aside, an interpretation of Article 51's reference to the
inherent right of states to act in their self-defense which has the effect of
vindicating calls by factions in an internal strife for outside help cannot be
said to enjoy unanimous acceptance in the world community.93 It is true that
the legitimacy of calls for French assistance in internal uprisings in Francophone Africa, though called into question, does not appear to have been
the subject of a sustained challenge by the world community.' Nor have
Britain's intervention in Tanzania in 1974, Tanzania's intervention in
Uganda later, and other incidents of this type elsewhere in Africa. But it
would be difficult to find support for the assertion that the legitimacy of such
intervention is readily accepted in the Americas, other than pursuant to
Article 3 of the Rio Treaty or under the auspices of the OAS, even before
but especially in light of the criticism of the military intervention in Grenada
by representatives of Latin American states at the meeting of the Permanent
Council of the OAS on October 26th, immediately after the intervention. 9
As noted, the Rio Treaty envisions two kinds of collective self-defense:
that permitted by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and Article 3 of
the Rio Treaty itself (i.e., in the event an armed attack occurs), and that
permitted by Article 6 of the Rio Treaty itself (i.e., in response to an
aggression which is not an armed attack). In the case of the latter, Article 6
calls for an immediate meeting of the Organ of Consultation in order to
agree on measures to assist the victim or, in any event, for the common
defense.
In theory, Article 6 may not be entirely compatible with Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter, in which case (by virtue of the supremacy clause in
Article 103 of the United Nations Charter and the acknowledgement in
Article 10 of the Rio Treaty) Article 51 must prevail. In the present context,
however, this point appears moot, since at no time did the Organ of
Consultation meet to (or otherwise) agree upon measures to be taken with
regard to the situation in Grenada.
In terms of the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and
3
Professor Louis B. Sohn recently observed: "Regardless of the merits of a particular
situation, the point is clear, I hope, that an invitation by one of the parties to an internal conflict
is not a sufficient justification for any intervention. " Supra note 50, at 227. See also Clark, supra
note 78, passim.
94
For example, in Kolwezi, Zaire, where French paratroopers defeated a rebellious faction of
the Zaire army in 1978; and more recently in Chad. See Moise, Can France Sustain an
Interventionist Consensus, Wall St. J., Nov. 30, 1983, at 29.
95
See Transcript, supra note 10, at pp. 11 (Colombia), 13 (Mexico), 17 (Argentina),
33 (Dominican Republic), 34 (Venezuela), 35 (Brazil), and 41 (Uruguay). The Council did not
have a resolution before it and did not take a formal vote.
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the Rio Treaty, it is difficult to square the commitment to sovereignty,
political independence and self-determination with allowing foreign forces
to decide which of rival factions will prevail in an internal struggle for power.
Where, as was the case here, the foreign forces are called in by a barely
credible government, the likelihood that the foreign state will forsake its
own national policy interests in favor of unconditional local self-determination is usually scant.96 In fact, the ordinary course of events leads to the
emergence of a government acceptable to the intervening state, whether or
not it happens as well to be preferred by the nationals of the state whose
independence has thus been compromised. In this respect, one of the least
desirable consequences of intervention in circumstances like those presented by the situation in Grenada is to lend a measure of legitimacy to the
otherwise discredited Brezhnev Doctrine, under which the Soviet Union
claims the right to intervene in any system that has adopted a socialist
government, for the purpose of preventing any change in that form of
government. That, strictly speaking, the Brezhnev Doctrine does not
appear to depend upon a request from the state concerned is of little
91In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on October 27th, Senator Sarbanes
asked Deputy Secretary Dam what would happen in the event elections in Grenada resulted in a
government that the United States did not like and thought was a danger to Americans who
remain on Grenada. Mr. Dam replied:
"I think that is an extremely hypothetical question, because I cannot imagine that such a
government would be acceptable to-well, first of all, that the Governor-General would
appoint such a prime minister. After all, he did not appoint Mr. Bishop. There was a coup
d'etat. Second, I cannot imagine that the believers in democracy that the OECS are, and
particularly Prime Minister Charles, would encourage the formation of such a government. I
understand what you are asking me, but you are asking me to speculate about a situation that
I would be extraordinarily surprised were it to occur. It is certainly not our purpose to create
such a situation."
THE SITUATION IN GRENADA, supra note 4, at 44.
Even in circumstances of civil unrest, aid to an incumbent government presupposes that it is
normally strong enough to suppress rebellion and to govern purposefully. Where the requesting
government lacks any means of asserting authority, its invitation to a powerful neighboring
state is especially susceptible to the latter's self-serving imposition of internal authority structure and/or policies. See generally Farer, Harnessing Rogue Elephants: A Short Discourse on
Foreign Intervention in Civil Strife, 82 HARV. L. REV. 511, 526 (1969); Moore, The Control of
Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 205, 281 (1969); Nanda, The United
States' Action in the Dominican Crisis: Impact on World Order-PartI, 43 DEN. L. REV. 439
(1966), Part II, 44 DEN. L. REV. 225 (1967).
Prior to the October 25th invasion, the United States had not had continuing diplomatic
representation on Grenada since the NJM seized power in 1979. Within five days of the invasion
the United States had opened a diplomatic mission, described by a correspondent from the New
York Times as the most powerful seat of civil authority on Grenada. N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1983,
at A16. By November 3rd, Mr. Scoon had ordered the explusion of-and United States officials
had evacuated-Cuban, Libyan and Soviet diplomats.
It has been widely reported that Mr. Coard and his politically active wife, Phyllis Coard, were
taken aboard a United States helicopter carrier following his capture on October 30th; and that
the three RMC leaders were not allowed to return to the island until November 6th, at which
time they were incarcerated. See Faerron, Chronology, 12 CARIBBEAN REV. 11 (1983).
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moment, since in practice the Soviet Union has generally contrived to have a
request of this sort available from someone in the target state, however
flimsy the cover.9 7 Similarly, the difference between preventing a prospective deviation from the path of socialism and correcting a deviation that has
already occurred from the path of democracy seems more a matter of which
system one prefers than a substantive difference in doctrine. The effect in
either case is to vindicate the use of force to bring about a change in the
nature or political policies of a foreign sovereign state. This objective,
however pleasing the result in particular cases, cannot be reconciled with the
purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, the Rio Treaty or
the Charter of the OAS.
It is clear by now that the kind of invasion to which Article 51 apparently
refers-is no longer the only form of aggression to which states find themselves exposed. For the time being, however, the "inherent" right of selfdefense referred to in Article 51 does not appear to contemplate military
response to all such threats. Since the self-defense permissible under Article
6 of the Rio Treaty contemplates responses authorized by the OAS, and
since the OAS did not authorize the intervention in Grenada, self-defense
does not appear to be available as a justification for the United States action
in Grenada.
The intervention in Grenada is sometimes loosely analogized to the
interdiction of missiles into Cuba in 1962. At that time, some legal scholars
defended the "quarantine" as an exercise of the right of self-defense under
Article 51.98 The United States government did not do so, however. As Mr.
Meeker noted at the time:
[Tihe United States, in adopting the defensive quarantine of Cuba, did not seek to
justify it as a measure required to meet an "armed attack" within the meaning of
Article 51. Nor did the United States seek to sustain its action on the ground that
Article 51 is not an all-inclusive statement of the right of self-defense and that the
quarantine was a measure of self-defense open to any country to take individually
for its own defense in a case other than "armed attack" ... [Tihe United States
took no position on either of these issues."
In the case of Grenada, too, the United States has consciously avoided
taking a position on these issues.

'See Sohn, supra note 50. Professor Moore writes that the Brezhnev doctrine "is actually the
converse of self-determination and clearly violates contemporary international law." Moore,

Legal Standards for Intervention in Internal Conflicts, 13 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 191, 197
(1983).
9
See e.g., McDougal, supra note 85, and Mallison, supra note 86.
"Meeker, supra note 49, at 523. See also Chayes, Law and the Quarantine of Cuba,
41 FOREIGN AFFAIRs 554 (1963), and 472 DEP'T ST. BULL. 764 (1962).
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B.

COLLECTIVE ACTION UNDER ARTICLES

52

AND

53

OF THE

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND

ARTICLES 22

AND

28

OF THE

OAS

CHARTER

1. Collective Regional Action Priorto Grenada
In 1962 the United States took the position that in authorizing the quarantine the OAS had acted consistently with the provisions of the United
Nations Charter contemplating regional peacekeeping. It will be recalled
that the Act of Chapultepec had recommended the execution of a treaty to
establish a regional arrangement, and had specifically provided that the "use
of armed force to prevent or repel aggression" constituted "regional action
which might appropriately be taken by the regional arrangement." When
the provisions of the United Nations Charter concerning regional arrangements were discussed at San Francisco, it was against this background." °
The result is that the Charter accords "regional arrangements and agencies" special priVileges. These include the right of collective self-defense
(Article 51), although collective defense, as restricted in the Charter, is
available to any group of states, regionally organized or not. More to the
point are the kinds of collective action permitted by Articles 52 and 53, in
each case subject to the supervision of the Security Council. Article 52(1)
provides:
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements
or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such
arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations.
Article 53(1) permits regional arrangements or agencies to take "enforcement action" either on their own if authorized by the Security Council or as
agents of the Council if the Council so orders.
That the OAS, although not in existence as such at the time the United
Nations Charter was adopted, was clearly envisioned in its provisions on
collective regional action cannot be doubted. The inter-American system
provided the principal context for the discussions of the proposed Article 52.
As noted above, the Act of Chapultepec had specifically provided for a
hemispheric arrangement to use "force to prevent or repel aggression;" this
arrangement, the OAS, was thus clearly written into the Charter. Arrangements like the OAS may be said to have the advantage of tempering any
ardor for unilateral resort to armed force by adding the institutional safeguards of a well-developed regional organization to the supervision of the
"°Othergroups of states, such as the Commonwealth and the newly formed League of Arab
States, had similar interests, but it was the inter-American system, and the Act of Chapultepec
in particular, that provided the principal context for the discussion. See Meeker, supra note 49
and Akehurst, supra note 54.
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Security Council. The Organ of Consultation created by the Rio Treaty, for
example, acts by a vote of two-thirds of the signatories to the Treaty (Article
17).1o1
Consequently, when the United States interposed the quarantine of Cuba
it said it had done so on the legal basis of the considered action taken by the
OAS pursuant to the Rio Treaty, which in turn incorporated the language
and purposes of the Act of Chapultepec, all as foreseen and authorized by
framers of the United Nations Charter in adopting Article 52.
The caution envisioned by the United Nations Charter before any organ
of any regional arrangement or agency uses armed force is evinced in two
ways to which reference has already been made. If the use of force is treated
as a peacekeeping operation, pursuant to Article 52(1), supra, then it is
subject to the requirement of Article 52(2) that the United Nations members involved "shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local
disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies
before referring them to the Security Council." If it is considered an "enforcement action," then in order to conform to the requirements2 of Article
53(1) it has to have been authorized by the Security Council.1

""This advantage is illustrated by the careful steps taken by the OAS prior to authorizing the
interdiction of missiles into Cuba in 1962. Prior to the October missile crisis itself, a formal
meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the OAS had found that the continental unity and the
democratic institutions of the hemisphere were endangered by "the subversive offensive of
communist governments." Acting pursuant to the OAS Charter as Organ of Consultation
under the Rio Treaty, a meeting of the OAS Foreign Ministers held in Punta del Este early in
1962 had taken collective action against Cuba, including a commercial blockade and the
exclusion of the Castro government from organs of the inter-American system. Finally, and
against this background, the Council of the OAS, meeting on October 23, 1962, had constituted
itself as the Provisional Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty, considered the evidence
before it of the secret introduction of Soviet strategic missiles into Cuba, concluded that it was
confronted with a situation that might endanger the peace of America within the meaning of
Article 6 of the Rio Treaty, and passed a resolution recommending that the member states, in
accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty, supra, "take all measures, individually and
collectively, including the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary to ensure that the
Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material
and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to prevent
the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace
and security of the Continent." Quoted in Meeker, supra note 49, at 517.
1°"For instance, in 1962 the United States took the position that the Council's authorization
could be inferred from the facts that, first, in meeting even before the OAS had adopted its
resolution authorizing the quarantine and before the United States Proclamation had been
issued putting it into effect, the Council nonetheless had not seen fit to take any action in
derogation of the quarantine; second, the Council had refrained from acting upon a Soviet
resolution and had decided, instead, by general consent, to promote the course of a negotiated
settlement, with the assistance of the United Nations Secretary-General; and third, the Council
had continued to pursue this course while the quarantine continued. See Meeker, supra note 49.
This interpretation seems strained. It has been criticized not only for construing nonaction by
the Security Council as "authorization," but also for concluding that authorization can come
after the fact, that is, after the irreversible fact that force has already been used. In any case, the
United States maintained that the quarantine did not constitute an "enforcement action" as
that term is used in Article 53(1). "Enforcement action," it said, refers to actions ordered by the
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2. The Grenada Intervention as Regional Collective Security
At the meeting of the Permanent Council of the OAS on October 26th,
the United States Representative, Ambassador J. William Middendorf II,
said that "regional collective security measures of the kind taken ... are
expressly contemplated by Article 52 [paragraph 1] of the United Nations
Charter.""'3 Speaking to the United Nations Security Council the following
day, the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations,
Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, said that the intervention in Grenada
"fully comported with relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter,
which accord regional organizations the authority to undertake collective
action."" And in his statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that same day, Deputy Secretary of State Dam said that "Article 52
of the United Nations Charter expressly permits regional arrangements for
the maintenance of peace and security consistent with the purposes and
principles of the United Nations. The actions and objectives of the [United
States-Caribbean] collective-security force in the circumstances . . . are
consistent with those purposes and principles.' '05
The government is not basing its claim on Article 53(1), as was the case,
for example, in 1962, perhaps implicitly following the suggestion then made
that the "enforcement actions" to which Article 53(1) applies do not include
ones made pursuant to mere recommendatory measures by regional
organizations. 01 6 Were it to do so, it would face the difficulty that on October
28th, the Security Council voted 11 to 1 (Britain, Togo and Zaire abstaining)
in favor of a resolution in which the Council "deeply deplore[d] the armed
intervention in Grenada" as a "flagrant violation of international law and of
the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of that state.' ' 7 The
veto cast by the United States blocked the resolution.
Security Council which are obligatory on United Nations members, not to actions only
recommended by the Security Council or by the General Assembly. By extension, Mr. Meeker
wrote, it refers as well to action taken by a regional organization that is obligatory upon its
members, but not to nonobligatory action. Id., at 521-22. The OAS resolution authorizing the
quarantine had been adopted pursuant to Article 6 of the Rio Treaty, supra, and was thus the
one measure which under Article 20 is not obligatory on parties to the Rio Treaty even when
agreed upon by the Organ of Consultation.
Not everyone agreed with the United States position. It was recalled, for example, that the
Act of Chapultepec, which the framers of the United Nations Charter were attempting to
accommodate, referred only to the collective use of force "to prevent or repel aggression."
Seligman, The Legality of the U.S. Quarantine Action Under the United Nations Charter,
49 A.B.A.J. 144 (1963). Furthermore, it has been pointed out that in light of the fact that OAS
resolutions for the use of force can never be more than recommendations, they would (according to the extended logic of the United States position) never be subject to Security Council
Akehurst, supra note 54, at 202.
authorization.
"°3 0AS Transcript, supra note 10, at 28-29.
4
" Press Release USUN 103-(83), Oct. 27, 1983, at 6.
"°5THE SITUATION IN GRENADA, supra note 4, at 6.
'0GSee supra note 102.
"'Text reprinted in the N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1983, at 4.
On November 2nd, the United Nations General Assembly voted 108 to 9 for a resolution
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The United States government's Article 52 argument does not rest upon
too firm a foundation in any case. As mentioned above, the second paragraph of Article 52 requires United Nation members entering into regional
arrangements to make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local
disputes through such regional arrangements ... before referring them to
the Security Council. So far as is known, neither the OECS nor the states
comprising the Grenada peace-keeping force made the kind of effort described in United Nations Charter Articles 2(3) and 33, supra, much less
"every effort," to resolve the crisis in Grenada through peaceful means.
Many commentators have expressed doubt that either the OECS or the
United States-Caribbean Peace-Keeping Force is the kind of regional
arrangement or agency the Charter contemplates. It is unlikely that either is
what the framers of the Charter had in mind, if only because they seem so
ill-suited to provide institutional restraint of the kind that renders Articles
52 and 53 consistent with the objectives of Article 2(4). °1
The Charter does not define the term "regional arrangements or agencies" in so many words. Article 52(1) appears to establish only three criteria:
that is, that the arrangement or agency be (i) regional, (ii) concerned with
the maintenance of international peace and security, and (iii) consistent
with the principles and purposes of the United Nations. A well-developed
organizational infrastructure or control mechanism is not specifically required; hence, the alternative of an "arrangement" or an "agency." Nor
does the arrangement or agency have to be concerned primarily with the
maintenance of international peace and security, so long as it is functioning
in this way in the given situation.'09
Greater difficulty comes in trying to justify the intervention as collective
security consistent with the terms of the Rio Treaty and the OAS Charter."'
As noted, the United States takes the position that the intervention was
undertaken in conformity with Articles 22 and 28 of the OAS Charter, that
is, that it constituted a measure taken for the maintenance of peace and
security in accordance with "existing treaties" (Article 22) and that it was
deploring the "armed intervention" in Grenada. Voting in favor of the resolution were such
Western states as Australia, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal and Spain. Among the 27 abstentions were Great Britain, Japan, West
Germany and Canada. Voting against the resolution were the United States, El Salvador, Israel
and the six Caribbean states which had taken part in the operation. Washington Post, Nov. 3,
1983, at Al. In the parlance of the United Nations, to "deplore" something is to condemn it in
unusually harsh terms.
'°Akehurst, supra note 54, at 177.
1O9d"

"'Secretary of State Shultz initially suggesied at a news conference that because the United
States acted in response to a request from the OECS, which in turn was acting under its own
constitutive treaty, it could do so without regard to the obligations contained in the OAS
Charter. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1983, at A19. This is clearly incorrect and may be presumed to
have been an inadvertent misstatement of the government's position.
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done "in furtherance of the principles of continental solidarity or collective
self-defense ... apply[ing] the measures and procedures established in the

special treaties on the subject" (Article 28). Whatever ambiguity may be
present in the text of these articles isolated from their negotiating history is
misleading, since that history refutes any suggestion of an intent to allow
parties to the OAS Charter to take part in collective security arrangements
within the hemisphere outside the OAS system."I Indeed, the original draft
version of these two articles had referred specifically to the Rio Treaty, by
name. But the delegates foresaw that the Rio Treaty might be amended,
revised into several treaties, absorbed in part in the charter they were
drafting, etc. So, out of caution they decided to adopt more generalized
language describing the Rio Treaty, effectively incorporating it, but avoiding language that would have to be amended every time the Rio Treaty was.
At no point in the discussion was the suggestion made that substituting
''existing treaties" and "special treaties on the subject" for "Rio Treaty"
opened the door for parties to the OAS Charter to engage in a parallel
system of collective security in the hemisphere. The objective of assuring the
solidarity of the system being completed at the conference, that is, the OAS
system, was referred to countless times, without any indication of intent to
authorize or permit what would be, for OAS members, an alternative to the
2
OAS."
Beyond consideration of the language of Article 52 of the United Nations
Charter and Articles 22 and 28 of the OAS Charter lie profoundly unsettling
questions about the effect that strained interpretations of them have as
precedent. Once a superpower has effectively asserted such an interpretation it becomes more difficult to repudiate or distinguish from comparably
strained interpretations. The fibre of the constraints on the use of force are
weakened just when they are most in need of strengthening. Like "collective
self-defense" that anticipates improbable armed attacks, "collective security" that serves to justify unilateral prerogatives concerning the use of force
is dangerous because it applies reciprocally and is contagious.
Earlier we indicated that we are not in a position to determine whether the
OECS states complied with their constituent instrument in joining with
Barbados, Jamaica and the United States in using military force to remove
...
See generally, Fenwick, The Ninth InternationalConference of American States, 42 AM. J.
L. 522, 556 (1948); Kunz, The Bogota Charterof the Organizationof American States, 42
AM. J. INT'L L. 568, 588 (1948). Moore, supra note 96, at 281n.
..See Actas y Documentos, Novena Conferencia Internacional Americana, Bogota, Colombia, marzo 30-mayo 2 de 1948, vol. II, pp. 218-19, and vol. IV, pp. 22-23,39-40,73-78 and
234-46. In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 27th,
Deputy Secretary Dam said the OAS Charter "envisions" treaties other than the Rio Treaty,
"So in a sense you have [in the Grenada operation] an OAS Force, but it is under the security
INT'L

provisions of the OAS envisaging collective defense and security."

THE SITUATION IN GRENADA,

supra note 4, at 35-36.
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the threat to their peace and security posed by the situation in Grenada. Of
course, if one takes the position that regional action under Article 52(1) of
the United Nations Charter can be undertaken by any group of states,
however loosely organized, then the OECS states' compliance with the
terms of the OECS Treaty may not be critical to compliance with Article
52(1). But if this is the case, it would only seem to strengthen the contention
that any collective action involving military force has to be regarded as
"enforcement action," that is, it operates under Articles 53 of the United
Nations Charter and has to be ordered or authorized by the Security Council. Otherwise, the use of force is open to any two or more states meeting the
easy criteria of a regional arrangement, regardless of whether they are
subject to any institutional control mechanism. It is difficult to see how such
a construction of Article 52 carries out the intentions and policies underlying
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter or Article 20 of the OAS Charter.
Moreover, for the reasons already adduced, the commitments undertaken by the United States in the Rio Treaty and the OAS Charter are not
overcome by the fact, if it is such, that the United States was requested to act
by a group of states acting under their own constitutive treaty in the hemisphere but outside the OAS system.
C.

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

At the time of the Entebbe rescue mission, the United States government
told the United Nations Security Council:
Israel's action in rescuing the hostages necessarily involved a temporary breach of
the territorial integrity of Uganda. Normally, such a breach would be impermissible under the Charter of the United Nations. However, there is a well-established
right to use limited force for the protection of one's own nationals from the
imminent threat of injury or death in a situation where the state in whose territory
they are located is either unwilling or unable to protect them. The right, flowing
from the right of self-defense, is limited to such use of force
3 as is necessary and
appropriate to protect threatened nationals from injury."
At the time of the intervention in Grenada, the American medical students were believed to be endangered by the collapse of civil authority on
the island, the murderous tendencies of the Austin-Coard faction and the
possibility that this faction would seize the Americans as hostages. Critics
have contended that the danger was overstated, that the principal threat to
the safety of the American medical students was posed by the military forces
during the initial phases of the invasion. We are not prepared to question the
government's judgment that the danger was real and imminent.
Not everyone agrees that a rescue intervention is justified under Article

"-31 U.N. SCOR (1941st meeting) 31, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 1941 (1976).
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2(4) of the United Nations Charter. It depends upon the assumption that the
Charter now admits of tacit understandings or that, in spite of the negotiating history of Article 2(4), the words "against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations" have the effect of narrowing the scope
of the proscription the Article contains.
The case for a rescue mission under Articles 18 and 20 of the OAS Charter
is weak, too. Thus, at the October 26th meeting of the OAS Permanent
Council, the representative of Colombia said (as translated) that "the
protection of the lives of the Americans cannot justify the invasion, because
Article 18 of the [OAS] Charter is very clear in saying that it proscribes the
right to intervene in the affairs of another whatever the motive." '"4 The
words of Article 20 are even less compromising, especially the phrases,
''even temporarily,' ''directly or indirectly," and most of all, "on any
grounds whatever." Moreover, it is not without historical justification that
the Latin American members of the OAS view with suspicion any attempt to
infer a humanitarian exception to Article 20 of the OAS Charter.
Even among those who accept the lawfulness of attempts to rescue one's
own nationals endangered abroad, as in the Entebbe situation, there is
virtual unanimity in the view that only a short-term use of armed force is
justified. The United States military troops, as noted, remained on Grenada
for nearly two months, long after those Americans who wished to be
evacuated had left." 5 The Grenada intervention seems to resemble the
United States intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and similar
episodes in the past in which the rescue of the intervening state's nationals
appears to have been collateral to the primary purpose of favorably resolving an internal political struggle.
Historically, the term "humanitarian intervention" has usually been reserved for those situations in which a state has claimed the right to intervene
militarily to protect the human rights of nationals of the target state or other
nationals, not its own nationals. The judgment of the world community on
this claim is not kind. Thus, Professor Brownlie of Oxford University has
written:
The state practice justifies the conclusion that no genuine case of humanitarian
intervention has occurred, with the possible exception of the occupation of Syria
"4OAS Transcript, supra note 10, at 11.
" 5On November 1st, 300 United States Marines invaded the Grenadian island of Cariacou,
located twenty miles north of Grenada itself, looking for Cubans and reportedly detaining some
seventeen individuals believed to be members of the RMC. N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1983, at Al.
By mid-November, United States troops had detained nearly 1,100 Grenadians and Cubans for
interrogation. Id., Nov. 14, 1983, at Al. It has been reported that in the wake of the
intervention in Grenada, the United States installed a psychological operations team at fhe
radio station in Grenada. Manning, supra note 1, at 76.
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in 1860 and 1861. With the embarrassing exception provided by Germany, the

institution has disappeared from modern state practice. As a matter of legal and
international policy this is a beneficial development. The institution did not
conspicuously enhance state relations and was applied only against weak states. It
belongs to an era of unequal relations...16

Concluding Observations and Recommendation
We are drawn to the conclusion that the United States' intervention in
Grenada is incompatible with those articles of the United Nations Charter,
the Rio Treaty and the Charter of the OAS that proscribe the use of force in
international relations other than in limited circumstances, none of which
appears to be applicable in this instance. We do not suggest, as others have,
that the United States was acting insincerely or without regard to the factors
which were cited publicly in justification of the intervention. Nor are we to
say to what extent these factors implicated important national security
interests. But we do say that the constraints imposed by the several relevant
treaties are not peripheral regulations; they lie at the core of international
efforts to minimize unilateral military intervention by states. For the United
States, moreover, they represent treaty commitments of the most fundamental kind. These constraints, our own international commitments and
the rule of law themselves represent national security interests, vital ones.
It may be time to reassess these constraints and these commitments to see
whether, in fact, they continue to serve the objectives which motivated
them. There appears to be room to argue that the United Nations Charter
does not deal adequately with externally supported subversion or indirect
aggression and anticipatory self-defense, and that it fails to place in proper
perspective all the policies that rightly bear upon decisions, made in good
faith, to intervene in the protection of human life and civil order. Perhaps,
too, the Rio Treaty and OAS Charter should be brought up to date to assure
a more efficient and effective role for the Organization of American States
in the western hemisphere. In any event, the time seems propitious to
initiate a study of these matters and we recommend that the Council consider doing so.

1161. BROWNLIE, supra note 47, at 340-342. See also Franck and Rodley, After Bangladesh:
The Law of HumanitarianIntervention by Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275, 302 (1973);
and HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS (R. Lillich ed. 1973).
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